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Martha Nussbaum, together with others, have criticised Rawls's theory for 
being unable to account for the claims of persons with mental disabilities. In 
this thesis, I examine their criticisms, and show that they (i) pose problems at 
different points of Rawls's theory, instead of simply at the level of the original 
position; (ii) they are mostly either too general to pose the kinds of serious 
problems to Rawls's theory as they intended, or they miss the mark; but (iii) 
some of them can be reformulated to do so. I then consider what resources 
Rawls's theory has to respond to these criticisms, and assess how well it 
responds to them. I conclude that while there are several gaps in Rawls's 
account of our treatment of the mentally disabled, it seems largely adequate. In 
fact, it appears to have more provisions for the mentally disabled than many 





In this thesis, I consider the problem that disability poses to Rawls's theory. In 
doing so, I consider the criticisms made by the capabilities theorists – most 
notably, Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum – which I will group under the 
term 'capabilities critique'. The critique centres on the claim that elements of 
Rawls's theory leads to the exclusion of the disabled. This is a fairly general 
claim, and I hope to show that it manifests in different forms and at different 
points of Rawls's framework. I will also argue that on closer look, much of the 
capabilities critique does not work. I move to reformulate their criticisms, and 
show that they pose different, but serious problems, to Rawl’s framework. 
Finally, I will argue that Rawls’s theory is mostly adequate to deal with issues 
of disability.  
 
I begin with a brief elucidation of the major elements of Rawls's framework, 
as they are situated within the context of his larger project. This will make it 
easier, later, to see where the different criticisms of his theory enter, and what 
resources he has to respond to them.   
 
In the chapters following that, I consider how Rawls's framework may be 
problematic, or give us inadequate responses when it comes to the question of 
how we should treat the mentally disabled in society. To do so, I begin with a 
generalisation of some cases of mental disabilities in concern, and use them to 
examine the problems they pose to Rawls's framework. I then argue that while 
the framework runs into several problems as it attempts to give us answer, it 
does not falter as much as critics of it claim. In fact, on closer look, Rawls's 
theory gives us quite a fair bit to navigate the issue of mental disability.  
 
 Preliminary distinctions 
 
Before we go on, it is useful to consider some preliminary definitions. First of 
all, the notion of disability. I will take disability as a function of the interaction 
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between an individual and her environment.1 This position takes a middle 
ground between the social and medical models of disability, and allows us to 
attribute disability not simplistically to 'inherent problems' with the individual, 
but also at the same time resist the over-quick attribution of all disability to the 
way society and its institutions are organised. Positing the interactional nature 
of disability allows us to examine the social structures that play a role in 
causing many disabilities, while allowing us the possibility of attributing the 
cause of some of them on to circumstances beyond our control (e.g. bad luck), 
where no amount of alteration of social structures can remove the disability.  
 
Following this, the disabled will be defined as individuals who are 
substantially limited in one or more major life functionings. Functionings are 
what Amartya Sen describes as "beings and doings" (Sen 1999).  They are all-
encompassing, and refer to all the "various states of human beings and 
activities that a person can undertake" (Robeyns 2011). For example, instances 
of functionings are such as being well-nourished, being sheltered, movement, 
thought, and the like. The term "functionings" act as a general placeholder for 
all possible human activities. Major functionings,2 on the other hand, are taken 
to be those functionings that are necessary for the pursuit of an individual's life 
plans, whatever it may be. While different sets of functionings are required for 
the pursuit of different life plans, major life functionings denote instead a 
narrow list of all those which are necessary for life plans in general, whatever 
they may be. This is a narrow conception of functionings; the motivation here 
is similar to Rawls's motivation for the list of goods that are required for life 
plans, whatever they may be.  
 
There are two aspects to a substantial limitation of major functionings. The 
first is a complete inability to achieve a major functioning, even with the 
introduction of medicine or technology; the second is a partial or incomplete 
ability to achieve a major functioning, with the introduction of medicine or 
technology. These two aspects correspond to, as well as denote, different kinds 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 I recognise that there is much contestation over how to define disability, but it is not within 
the scope of this paper to consider that.  
2 Henceforth abbreviated as major functionings. 
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of disabilities. The severely mentally disabled, as well as many others with 
mental disabilities, fall under the first type – they are unable to achieve one or 
more major functionings no matter what we can do. The second type includes 
all other kinds of disabilities for which medicine and technology are of help, 
albeit incompletely. 
 
Let us consider the implications of defining disability as a substantial 
limitation of major functionings. First, an individual is not disabled in the case 
that she is able to achieve major functionings with the assistance of medicine 
or technology. This is clear in the case of a myopic individual. She possesses 
certain features – in this case, bad eyesight – which results in her facing many 
difficulties in carrying out many major functionings. However, with the 
introduction of technology – corrective lenses – she becomes able to perform 
those major functionings for which she was only able to partially, and with 
difficulty. Insofar as this technology is made available to her, she cannot be 
considered disabled. However, because of the way we have defined disability, 
the possibility remains that without the technology, this individual will be 
considered disabled. Second, an individual is considered disabled in the case 
that she is only partially or incompletely able to achieve major functionings 
with the introduction of medicine or technology. The example here is of an 
individual with Down's Syndrome – who is only able to achieve many major 
functionings only incompletely even with the introduction of medicine and 
technology.3  
 
The group of disabled people is a 'fluid' group. Its membership varies in 
relation to (a) the state of medicine and (b) technological advancement in a 
society, as well as (c) the set-up of the physical spaces and (d) age, among 
others. In different societies with different instantiations of these factors, 
different people will be deemed disabled. For instance, in a society which 
lacks the technology for making corrective lenses, many people will be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Things are changing quickly, with new research foregrounding the possibility of removing 




deemed as disabled for being unable to achieve many major functionings due 
to bad eyesight. 
 
A note has to be made. Age has been included as one of the factors that results 
in determining the membership of the group of disabled. If we look at persons 
across time, we see that the elderly or the very young exhibit many parallels of 
the same limitations in major functionings as those whom we usually deem as 
disabled. These are limitations pertaining to movement, to the senses, or 
mental capacities. One of the implications of defining disability as a 
substantial limitation in major functionings means that children and the elderly 
are to be considered disabled. While this paints a picture of the elderly that we 
can accept, it seems to run counter to how we usually describe children. It is 
not usual that we think of young children as disabled, even as they are unable 
to achieve certain major functionings. However, this picture becomes easier to 
accept once we see that on our picture of disability, the 'disability' of children 
is at most temporary. Given that the disabled denotes a group for which 
membership is fluid, we can accept that we move in and out of disability at 
various phases of our lives, in light of the circumstances that we face. We not 
only enter it as very young children and as the elderly, but also in times of 
accident or severe depression – being disabled simply points to our being 
substantially limited in one or more major functionings, either temporarily or 
permanently. The description of the disabled is insensitive to time, and leaves 
open the time span for which one is disabled. 
 
With these preliminary definitions, let us move to consider what kinds of 
claims disabled individuals have. Like all other citizens, the disabled have 
claims to the fair access to the conditions necessary for the pursuit of their life 
plans. This coheres well with the motivation of the parties in the original 
position, which is to ensure these conditions as well. In saying this, no 
distinction is made between the claims of ordinary and disabled citizens.4 
Complaints arise when citizens do not have fair access to the conditions 
necessary for the pursuit of their life plans. These can be in instances where 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Later, we will consider the claims that the disabled are not citizens.  
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(a) they do not have access to the conditions at all, or (b) they only have 
access to them formally and not substantively. The distinction between formal 
and substantive access to the conditions is drawn from Rawls's distinction 
between formal and fair, when he spoke of it as applicable to the analysis of 
the equality of opportunities between citizens (TJ 73/63). Roughly, the 
distinction is as follows. One has formal access to the conditions necessary to 
the pursuit of her life plans when her access to it is granted by the basic 
structure she is in. However, formal access leaves as an open question whether 
or not she will have actual or substantive access to those conditions. Consider 
a hierarchical society where land has traditionally been owned by members of 
the noble class.5 Reformers manage to change the constitution, such that all 
those who manage to fill in certain forms are able to own the lands they have 
lived on. This means that, formally, anyone could own land. However, 
because of widespread illiteracy, only members of the noble class have the 
ability to fill in the forms – they still end up owning all the land. In this case, 
we say that the ordinary citizens merely have formal and not substantive 
access to owning land. They only have substantive access in the case that they 
have the abilities to fill in the forms – where land-owning is actually 
accessible. 
 
We can now understand the initial criticism – that Rawls's theory excludes 
disabled people – as follows: the theory is unable to, for a group of people (the 
disabled), guarantee substantively the conditions necessary for the pursuit of 
life plans. We will see this claim recur across the chapters as we situate the 
different criticisms within Rawls's framework. But first, a brief elucidation of 
Rawls's framework.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 C.f. Williams 1981. 
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2 Rawls's theory of justice 
 
In this section, I will summarise Rawls’s theory of justice. In particular, I will 
describe the major elements of his theory, and situate it within the context of 
his larger project. This will make it easier, later, to see where the criticisms of 
his theory enter, and what resources he already has to respond to them. It will 
also pave the way to assessing what kinds of elaborations and extensions of 
the theory are later necessary in answering the capabilities critique. 
 
First, we must understand Rawls as engaging in the process of reflective 
equilibrium, which “is the most general idea of justification [within Rawls], 
and which provides the framework for understanding” (Freeman 2007, 29) the 
various elements in Rawls’s theory. When engaging in reflective equilibrium, 
we begin preliminarily with our considered moral judgements about justice. 
Considered moral judgements are judgements “rendered under conditions 
favorable to the exercise of the sense of justice, and therefore in circumstances 
where the more common excuses and explanations for making a mistake do 
not obtain” (TJ 47-48/42), and “in which we have the greatest confidence (TJ 
19/17). We have these judgements at all levels of generality, and take them as 
“fixed points which we presume any conception of justice must fit” (TJ 
20/18). Reaching these judgements via reflection, we subsequently engage in a 
process of organisation to make them coherent, in order to articulate an 
account of justice on their basis. This is what Rawls means by regarding “a 
theory of justice as describing our sense of justice” (TJ 46/41). In doing so, 
Rawls does not presume that all the CMJs we begin with are already 
consistent and congenial to this exercise. In the process of articulating an 
account of justice, some CMJs can be revised or dropped, if they run counter 
to others. Rawls says little about the norms of elimination and revision, but we 
are supposed to have a sense of which of the CMJs are able to fit “together 
into one coherent view” (TJ 21/19), and which are not. Presumably, this can 
be resolved by including our convictions about consistency and coherence, or 




Seen this way, Rawls’s theory is intended to be a systematic articulation of our 
convictions about justice. The various elements in his theory - the original 
position, veil of ignorance, well-ordered society - ought to be seen as part of 
this larger justificatory framework. It is only in this way that we can precisely 
locate the point at which various criticisms enter, and how they may be 
resolved. But first, a delineation of the various elements.  
 
While Rawls recognises that there are many other things that we usually 
describe as just or unjust (TJ 6/6), he nevertheless chooses to narrow the topic 
of his concern to social justice. For him, whenever the term justice is used, it 
refers to social justice. This narrowing excludes other things such as ethical or 
epistemic justice. In referring to social justice, Rawls's primary concern is that 
society must be organised in a certain manner, such that it regulates “the 
interactions of their participants in a morally acceptable manner” (Pogge 2007, 
171). 
 
Still, there are many aspects of social justice that one can be concerned about. 
In wanting to regulate the interactions of participants in a society, Rawls is not 
as much interested in individual interactions, as he is in the background 
conditions within which those actions take place. His goal is to ensure that the 
latter are structured in such a way that does not unfairly diminish the life 
prospects of its participants.6 Rawls calls these the "basic structure of society". 
The basic structure refers to “the way in which the major social institutions fit 
together into one system, and how they assign fundamental rights and duties 
and shape the division of advantages that arises through social cooperation” 
(Rawls 1977, 159; TJ 7/6; JF 10). Major social institutions are “the political 
constitution and principal economic and social arrangements”, such as “the 
legal protection of freedom of thought and liberty of conscience, competitive 
markets, private property in the means of production, and the monogamous 
family” (TJ 7/6). The basic structure is the primary subject because it “defines 
men’s rights and duties and influence their life prospects, what they can expect 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 I see two strands of argument in Rawls – one involving the mitigation of unfair 
disadvantages in the pursuit of life plans, and the other the ensuring of maximal conditions for 
the pursuit of life plans. This points to an unresolved tension within his framework which I 
will not have space to discuss.   
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to be and how well they can hope to do”, in a manner “profound and present 
from the start” (TJ 7/6-7).7  
 
The scope of our concerns has been restricted to include only the basic 
structure. What we have discussed so far constitutes, for Rawls, a concept of 
justice. Following H.L.A Hart, Rawls makes a distinction between a concept 
and a conception of justice (TJ 5/5). A concept refers to the notion or 
“meaning of the term” (PL 14n15) itself, whereas a conception refers to the 
particular interpretation or instantiations of the concept. Whereas a concept is 
abstract, a conception is concrete in the sense that it includes standards or 
norms concerning the application of the concept in various contexts. Rawls 
gives an example:  
 
To illustrate: the concept of justice, applied to an institution, means, say 
that the institution makes no arbitrary distinctions between persons in 
assigning basic rights and duties, and that its rules establish a proper 
balance between competing claims. Whereas a conception includes, 
besides this, principles and criteria for deciding which distinctions are 
arbitrary and when a balance between competing claims is proper. (PL 
14n15) 
 
The description of justice as involving social justice, the primary subject of 
which is the basic structure, constitutes a description of the concept. We can 
all agree on the concept, while at the same time disagreeing on how that 
concept ought to be instantiated – on the conception. It is in coming up with an 
account of how the basic structure ought to be organised or regulated, that 
people come to disagree. This is because the instantiation of the concept 
requires agreement not only at the abstract level but also at the level of 
principles and criteria for making decisions about specific cases. For instance, 
even if we all agree to the concept of interpersonal justice as not harming 
others unnecessarily, it is only when we get to the level of the criteria for 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Opinion on this is far from settled – there are criticisms that the basic structure thus defined 
is an incomplete picture of all that which affects people’s life prospects.. However, I will not 
engage this debate within this paper. C.f. Young (2006). 
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determining what specifically counts as "harm" that we come to disagree.  
 
People disagree because of what Rawls calls "the fact of reasonable pluralism" 
– that they hold on to different but reasonable comprehensive  religious, 
philosophical and moral doctrines (PL xviii; PL 24n27), many of which are 
irreconcilable with one another.8 Given the fact of reasonable pluralism, the 
task then is to come up with a conception of justice that people can agree to, 
regardless of the different comprehensive doctrines they hold on to.  
 
Rawls's attempt to come up with a conception of justice – principles, norms, 
standards – that these people can all agree to, is done via the device of the 
original position. The original position is presented by Rawls as a 
"philosophical interpretation of the initial situation" (TJ 118/102) in which 
parties are made to choose principles of justice to organise and regulate the 
basic structure. However, it is often neglected that the original position is 
designed to correspond with the features of a well-ordered society (CP 250, 
Freeman 2006, 184, 405-406). The "aim of the description of the original 
position is to put together in one conception of the idea of fairness with the 
formal conditions expressed by the notion of a well-ordered society" (CP 237). 
The workings of the former depends, among other things, crucially on the 
latter – and it is to that that we ought to first look. 
 
First of all, a well-ordered society exists "under circumstances that require 
some conception of justice and give point to its peculiar role" (CP 234). Rawls 
calls these the "circumstances of justice", which are “the normal conditions 
under which human cooperation is both possible and necessary” (TJ 126/106). 
The circumstances of justice are divided into two kinds –objective and 
subjective. The former are facts of matters about the world in which 
cooperation is required – (1) moderate scarcity of resources, (2) coexistence in 
a geographical territory of human subjects who are (3) roughly equal in 
physical and mental powers. The latter refers to the subjects of cooperation – 
who, in this case, are citizens of the well-ordered society – that they (4) have 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 This seems to be more an empirical, than analytic, point.  
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similar needs and interests, (5) have different life plans (or conceptions of the 
good) which are in opposition or incompatible with each other, and (6) are 
fallible in their knowledge and faculties of thought (TJ 126-127/109-110; CP 
234). It is only in these circumstances that Rawls thinks that justice arises. 
Without them, there would be “no occasion for” justice (TJ 128/110). 
Additionally, the citizens are described as having and viewing themselves as 
having (7) a normally effective sense of justice, and (8) a right to equal respect 
and consideration in determining the principles by which the basic structure of 
their society is to be regulated (CP 233; PL §6). 
 
The circumstances of justice are intended to be a realistic model of the 
situation of modern societies for which justice has a primary role. In societies 
where the circumstances do not obtain, then justice may not occupy the most 
important role. For instance, in a society where there is an extreme scarcity of 
resources such that basic needs of the people are not even met with the 
existing resources, there would be no occasion for justice. In such 
circumstances, justice takes a backseat to more important task of ensuring that 
basic needs are met.   
 
In addition, a well-ordered society represents the ideal that we seek. It brings 
together "certain features of any society that it seems one would, on due 
reflection, wish to live in and want to shape our interests and character" (CP 
233). This ideal comprises: that (9) everyone accepts, and knows that 
everyone else accepts, the very same principles (the same conception) of 
justice;9 (10) its basic structure is known, or with good reason believed, to 
satisfy these principles; and (11) the public conception of justice is founded on 
reasonable beliefs that have been established by generally accepted methods of 
inquiry (CP 233). Finally, the basic structure within a well-ordered society is 
(12) "a more or less self-sufficient and productive scheme of social 
cooperation for [the] mutual good" (CP 234) of its participants.  
 
The role of the original position is that it arises as a device for coming to an 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 This condition is related to condition (7) – while (7) refers to the possession of a sense of 
justice, (9) refers to  its actual instantiation. 
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agreement about a conception of justice appropriate for a well-ordered society 
thus described (CP 236). Rawls holds that " the particular conception that is 
most suitable for a well-ordered society is the one that would be unanimously 
agreed to in a hypothetical situation that is fair between individuals conceived 
as fair and equal moral persons, that is, as members of such a society" (CP 
236). The parties making the choice of principles in the original position are  
intended to be seen as representatives of members of the well-ordered society 
(Freeman 2006, 417; CP 237). Because of this, they are correspondingly 
cognisant of the characteristics of the well-ordered society – that it is situated 
within certain circumstances of justice, that the citizens they represent have 
certain characteristics (conditions 1 to 8), and that there are certain ideals that 
they are working towards (conditions 9 to 12).  
 
Having the parties represent members of a well-ordered society is important 
for another reason. Recall conditions (7) and (9), where the members are 
assumed to have, and act on, a normally effective sense of justice. What this 
means is that they are not only cognisant of what kinds of claims it is 
legitimate to make on one another (CP 237), but also that in making claims on 
one another they adopt a point of view not beginning from their 
comprehensive doctrines but from a public conception of justice (CP 237). 
These conditions effectively act as a constraint on the kinds of decisions that 
can be made by the parties. The parties are not going to make unreasonable or 
exceedingly onerous claims on the other parties in the original position, but 
they would regulate their demands on the basis of what is reasonable for them 
to make. How they determine what is reasonable then depends on them 
adopting the point of view of the public conception of justice – that is, they 
adopt the point of view from the basis of the values that underlie principles of 
justice that organise and regulate the basic structure of society. This is what 
Rawls calls reciprocity. Rawls intends for reciprocity to be "a relation between 
citizens in a well-ordered society" (PL 17), acting as an idea that mediates 
"between the idea of impartiality, which is altruistic (being moved by the 
general good), and the idea of mutual advantage understood as everyone's 
being advantaged with respect to each person's present or expected future 




The other conditions have to be seen in light of this existing relation. For 
instance, even though condition (12) states that social cooperation is for the 
mutual good of the participants, their understanding of what counts as mutual 
good is not a selfish one, but one that is calibrated on the basis of taking into 
account the needs and interests of the others – via adopting the point of view 
of the public conception of justice (Freeman 2006, 400-408).  
 
To ensure that the judgements of the participants in the original position are 
not affected by knowledge of their personal characteristics and social 
positions, Rawls posits a veil of ignorance that takes effect within the original 
position. Under this veil, participants are devoid of all information about 
themselves that pertain to their unique social and historical circumstances. It 
“ensures that no one is advantaged or disadvantaged in the choice of principles 
by the outcome of natural chance or the contingencies of social 
circumstances” (TJ 12/11). This is because a person's knowledge, in the 
original position, of his “place in society, his class position or social status… 
his fortune in the distribution of natural assets and abilities, his intelligence 
and strength, and the like”, can distort his judgement of what principles he 
finds most agreeable to him, and he may be tempted to “exploit social and 
natural circumstances” (TJ 136/118) to his own advantage. Without this 
distorting information, the parties become “similarly situated and no one is 
able to design principles to favour his particular condition” (TJ 12/11). The 
principles that are chosen in the original position then can be considered “the 
result of a fair agreement or bargain” (TJ 12/11). In light of the larger 
framework, we have to see the veil of ignorance as a heuristic device intended 
to capture our convictions about what is relevant from the point-of-view of 
justice. For instance, our conviction that some features of persons – such as 
their race or religious beliefs –are irrelevant, is expressed in the veil of 
ignorance as an ignorance about these features. Insofar as we accept the force 
of these convictions, we have to accept the work that the veil of ignorance 




The parties, in light of condition (5), know that the citizens they represent 
have life plans (or conceptions of the good), and are interested to pursue their 
life plans as best as they can. The principles that they choose have to ensure 
that the conditions of such a pursuit are present rather than absent, and 
maximised rather than diminished. However, because of the veil of ignorance, 
they do not know what exact life plan they have, and are unable to come up 
with precise conditions to enable their pursuits. What they then do, is to come 
up with general conditions that are capable of enabling life plans, whatever 
they may be. The possibility of coming up with such general conditions is 
ensured because of condition (4), which is that the parties have similar needs 
and interests. If their needs and interests were too divergent, then such a 
general list would not be adequate in capturing them.10  
 
The primary social goods11 are intended to constitute the general conditions 
that allow for the pursuit of life plans, whatever they may be (TJ §15; CP 313-
314, 454; PL 181, 308-309; Rawls 1982). The primary goods  “[enable] the 
parties to promote their conception of the good most effectively whatever it 
turns out to be” (TJ 144/125). Without these, however, their pursuits may be 
hindered, or rendered impossible. Also, like the veil of ignorance, the list of 
primary goods is intended to capture our convictions about what is needed for 
the pursuit of life plans. They can be summarised follows: 
 
A. certain basic liberties (TJ §15; PL 291); 
B. freedom of movement and free choice of occupation; 
C. powers and prerogatives of offices;  
D. income and wealth; 
E. residual social bases of self-respect ("residual" because Rawls views 
the first four primary goods as bases of self-respect as well).  
(from PL 181)12  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Later, we will discuss various criticisms about this claim.  
11 Rawls switches between using the terms "social primary goods" and "primary social goods". 
I will use "primary goods" to refer to the both of them.  
12 c.f. Pogge 2007, 73; Freeman 2007, 63-5 
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Insofar as the parties in the original position try to provide for as favourable 
conditions as possible that allow them to pursue their life interests, they are 
motivated to ensure that they not only "have an adequate share of primary 
goods", but also that they have "more primary social goods rather than less". 
(TJ 142/123, see also Freeman 2007, 153).  
 
The primary goods are goods the distribution of which can be affected by the 
organisation and regulation of the basic structure of society. This is in contrast 
to what Rawls calls natural goods. For Rawls, natural goods such as health, 
intelligence, talent or skills, “are not so directly under [the] control" of the 
basic structure, “although their possession is influenced by the basic structure” 
(TJ 62/54). For Rawls, their (larger degree of) independence from the basic 
structure allows him to put aside the questions of the variances in its 
distribution. What he is more interested in is the distribution of resources that 
are under the direct control and influence of the basic structure. The 
possession of social goods, according to Rawls, depends crucially on the 
organisation of the basic structure, and constitutes, to a large extent and 
profound degree, the starting positions and life prospects of individuals in 
society, right from the start of their lives. His project has to be seen as an 
attempt to address the inequalities in starting positions and life prospects via 
addressing the inequalities in primary goods.  
 
A qualification needs to be made. Rawls says of the primary goods that they 
are "clearly not intended as a measure of … well-being" (PL 187-188). 
However essential they are for the pursuit of life plans, they are "clearly not 
anyone's idea of the basic values of human life and must not be so understood" 
(PL 188, emphasis mine). This is because the primary goods are restricted to 
the political domain – to the needs of individuals, as citizens, when questions 
of justice arise (PL 188). And needs as citizens are not all that play a role in 
the pursuit of life plans – "desires, wishes, and likings" (PL 189n20) play a 
role as well. So, the goods have to be seen as constituting the general and 
necessary conditions that can enable the pursuit of life plans, whatever they 
may be, while remaining silent about the other factors that play a role in the 
pursuit of life plans. Insofar as well-being is measured by the success of the 
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pursuit of life plans – which include factors other than primary goods – the 
primary goods cannot be a measure of well-being. A person with large 
amounts of primary goods cannot immediately be said to have a high-level of 
well-being, because he may lack certain things which are required for the 
successful pursuit of his life plans, but which are not included in the primary 
goods – such as the exercise and flourishing of the faculty of imagination, or 
of play (FJ 76). 
 
The work of the parties in the original position is not over at the point of 
choosing principles of justice. Rawls conceived of the original position to only 
be the first of a four-stage hypothetical, deliberative sequence that the parties 
have to go through (TJ §31). After the first stage, where the principles are 
chosen, the parties move to the constitutional stage. There, the veil of 
ignorance is partly lifted, and the parties know the "relevant general facts 
about their society, that is, its natural circumstances and resources, its level of 
economic advance and political culture, and so on" (TJ 197/172-173). In light 
of this information and the principles chosen in the previous stage, they "are to 
design a system for the constitutional powers of government and the basic 
rights of citizens" (TJ 197/172). In particular, they have to ensure that the 
constitution they choose satisfies the demands of the first principle, which 
guarantees each person "an equal claim to a fully adequate scheme of equal 
basic rights and liberties" (PL 5). Next, the parties move to the legislative 
stage. The veil of ignorance is further lifted, and the "full range of general 
economic and social facts" are made known. The parties are tasked to choose 
and assess the "laws and policies' (TJ 198/174) in light of the information, and 
the demands of the second principle chosen in the first stage – that "social and 
economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both (a) to the 
greatest benefit of the least advantaged… and, (b) attached to offices and 
positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity" (TJ 
302/266). The final stage is "that of the application of rules to particular cases 
by judges and administrators" (TJ 199/175). Only at this stage do the parties 
have access to information about themselves, for the veil of ignorance is 
completely lifted, and "everyone has complete access to all the facts" (TJ 
199/175). At this stage, the parties attempt to apply the principles of justice in 
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order to get "specific prescriptions and permissions regarding what individuals 
or institutions are to do in particular cases" (Freeman 2007, 208).  
 
Rawls intends that at each stage, certain kinds of issues are fore-grounded and 
resolved, before moving on to the next stage. Information that is required to 
resolve those issues at each stage is revealed through partially lifting the veil, 
while those "likely to give rise to bias and distortion and to set men against 
one another [are] ruled out" (TJ 200/175-176). In light of our earlier 
discussion, we can understand the separation of the stages as connected to the 
ideal of the well-ordered society. In particular, each stage model the procedure 
that citizens in a well-ordered society would undergo in order to apply the 
principles of justice to their society. There are two components – the tasks at 
hand, and the informational constraints. The separation of tasks model the 
citizens' agreement on what issues take priority over others. For instance, in 
deciding on the constitution prior to laws and social policies, the citizens in 
effect agree to the "priority of the first principle of justice to the second" (TJ 
199/175). The informational constraints at each stage model the citizens' 
agreement on what kinds of information are relevant to solving the issues at 
hand justly, and which are not. It is in this way that Rawls spoke of each stage 
as representing "an appropriate point of view from which certain kinds of 
questions are considered" (TJ 196/172).  
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In the earlier chapter, I briefly described Rawls's framework. In the following 
chapters, I will consider how Rawls's framework may be problematic, or give 
us inadequate responses when it comes to the question of how we should treat 
the mentally disabled in society.  
 
The topic is mental disability because it has been taken to pose the "most 
daunting challenge to Rawls's theory" (FJ 112). This stems from an 
observation that many of Rawls's critics have pointed out – that the mentally 
disabled do not posses some characteristics that are purportedly crucial to 
Rawls's theory. In criticising his theory for its adequacy in dealing with mental 
disability, many critics begin with some specific cases, then move to consider 
the implications that the theory has for them. This falls in line with Amartya 
Sen's idea that we can ground a criticism of a theory or principle "by taking up 
particular cases in which the results of employing that principle can be seen in 
a rather stark way, and then to examine these implications against our 
intuition" or considered judgements (Sen 1979). Similarly, we will begin this 
chapter by discussing some of the central cases that have been brought 
forward as those for which Rawls's framework falters. I reach some 
generalisations about these cases, then mount the criticisms against Rawls's 
framework on their basis. I then consider what resources Rawls has to respond 
to these criticisms. I show that even though these cases pose serious problems 
for Rawls, a closer reading shows that he has more resources than is often 
thought to respond to them. On the whole, Rawls's theory does not fare poorly 
in responding to the claims of mentally disabled persons. Finally, I stop to 
reflect on the nature of the problem posed by mental disabilities to Rawls's 
framework.  
 




Consider the following list of cases, oft-cited in the literature and used as 
starting points for many criticisms: 
 
Arthur. Arthur has both Asperger's and Tourette's syndromes. While 
conversant in abstract topics, he has few social skills and is unable to 
learn them. He is highly emotionally dependent on his caretakers and 
cannot be left alone for more than a minute. He does not fare well in 
public schools (FJ 96-97).  
 
Jamie. Jamie was born with Down's syndrome. Associated with this 
syndrome are mental retardation, stunted growth, and speech 
impairment. He does not learn in a manner similar to other children, 
and requires the help of various therapists to help in the development 
of his tongue and neck muscles, among others (Berube 1996) 
 
Sesha. Sesha is a young woman in her late twenties, and suffers from 
congenital cerebral palsy and severe mental retardation. She is 
profoundly dependent on others for everyday activities like cleaning 
and eating, and is unable to communicate with others (Kittay 1999). 
 
These cases all involve limitations in major functionings, especially 
limitations of a cognitive sort, and can be arranged on a spectrum on the basis 
of the severity of the limitations. On one end of the spectrum, the limitations 
are serious but still negotiable via medicine, technology, and education – as in 
the case of Arthur. On the other end, the limitations are both serious and 
unameliorable – as in Sesha. While the individuals in these cases all have 
experiential states and interests, they possess only incompletely (or lack 
entirely, in the more severe cases) the powers and functionings required to 
identify with themselves or relate to others and their environments in manners 
conducive for the formulation, revision, or pursuit of life plans.13 In the most 
severe case, Sesha cannot be said to have life plans at all. These individuals 
are also unable to participate in everyday activities in manners similar to most 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




other people, nor are they able to contribute to the collective social good on 
their own. In addition, their profound dependency on others for everyday 





One of the recurring criticisms against Rawls's theory lies in his postponement 
of the issue of disability till the later stages of the theory (FJ 108) – a move 
that purportedly is "not innocent" (FJ 127), and results in unpalatable 
consequences.  
 
First, it "runs the risk of suggesting that our obligations to those with the two 
moral powers are more important than our obligations to the mentally 
disabled" (Hartley 2009, 140). This argument runs along the following lines: 
because the claims of the disabled are only considered "after basic political 
principles are already chosen" (FJ 109), the implication is that meeting their 
claims is not an issue of basic political justice. Our duties to them 
correspondingly lie outside basic political justice. Nussbaum worries that this 
subsequently leads us to a mistaken understanding of the claims of people who 
take care of the disabled as lying outside the scope of basic justice (FJ 218-
220). 
 
The second is a worry that postponing the claims of the disabled till a later 
stage makes the theory ill-prepared to deal with their claims (FJ 109). Citizens 
who are not disabled have claims which are different in nature from those who 
are disabled. Beginning from citizens who are not mentally disabled, we may 
end up with principles that are only based on the needs of these members, and 
not extendable or applicable to responding to the claims of the disabled (FJ 
109-110). In addition to this, Nussbaum argues that the exclusion of the claims 
of the disabled may also result in the exclusion of some of the claims by 
people whom we deem as non-disabled. This is because ordinary human life is 
characterised, at various phases (sickness or old age), by dependence and 
incapacitation which are functionally analogous to what we deem as disability 
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(FJ 87-88). If the principles are unable to deal with the claims of the disabled, 
then it is similarly unable to deal with these phases of ordinary human life. 
 
However, the first criticism hinges on a loose understanding of the act of 
postponement. On closer look, it is not clear that there are any necessary 
connections between the former and the latter (Cureton 2006, 8; Richardson 
2006; Freeman 2006). Once we situate Rawls's postponement in the context of 
the four-stage hypothetical sequence (of which the original position is but the 
first stage) we see that the postponement is actually intended to consider the 
claims of the disabled more appropriately. In what follows I explain Rawls's 
postponement of the issue of disability (PL 184). 
 
We recall that the task of the parties in the original position is to come up with 
principles to regulate the basic structure of society. In the original position, the 
parties lack information about what disabilities there are (just as they lack 
knowledge of what races there are). This means that they do not have any 
basis of tailoring principles that deal specifically with the disabled – inasmuch 
as they are similarly lack the information to deal with specific cases pertaining 
to the non-disabled. The principles that emerge from the original position can 
only be at the most general level, and the specific interpretations and 
instantiations will have to come at the later stages.  
 
Any attempt to include the issue of disability at the level of the original 
position runs into a serious problem, once we consider what it truly involves – 
the parties have to come up with general principles to ensure the conditions for 
the disabled to pursue their life plans. This runs us into an over-
demandingness problem. We recall that the principles chosen in the original 
position guide, and act as constraints to, the decisions made in the later stages. 
If we have the principles include the disabled from the start, there is a worry 
that they may generate specific applications that may end up to be over-
demanding. If it is stated at the most general level that all those who are 
disabled have to have the conditions for their pursuit of life plans ensured, 
then the parties may find in the later stages – upon the partial lifting of the veil 
and having more information about their society and the resources available to 
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them – that they either have to spend most of their resources on medical 
technologies or research in order to bring the most severely disabled up to a 
point where they are able to pursue their life plans, or else act against the 
demands of the principles. Take for instance, the cases of individuals in a 
persistent vegetative state (PVS) –those we take clearly to be disabled. What 
does it mean for the principles to ensure that these patients have access to the 
conditions for their life plans? We know that actual political decisions cannot 
violate or ignore the principles chosen in the original position. So does this 
mean that the basic structure has to invest heavily in medical technologies in 
order to ensure that even the most disabled citizens – those whose disability 
we currently take to be unameliorable – be granted actual access to the 
conditions for their life plans? Not only would this consume many resources, 
it also appears to misunderstand the duties that we owe to such persons. The 
PVS case is admittedly an extreme case – but the same can be said for other 
cases of mental disability, mentioned above. This is not very appealing 
solution. 
 
Tentatively, the more plausible option is to say that there is a line under which 
a different scheme of things has to be provided. For instance, in the case of the 
mentally disabled, we see that we need not try to ensure that they possess the 
liberties to an equal value, or the conditions to pursue their life plans – they 
are simply unable to form life plans. For them, perhaps all we have to do is 
make sure that they are humanely treated as participants of a just social 
system. For all those above the line – the mildly mentally disabled or the 
physically disabled – we can then try to ensure the conditions for the pursuit of 
their life plans. This avoids the problem of the parties finding that they have to 
expend their resources on guaranteeing the same scheme of liberties and goods 
to those who may never be able to make use of them. However, on closer look, 
this is a move that can only be done when the parties have information on "the 
prevalence and kinds of [disabilities]" present in society (PL 184) – 
information available only at the legislative stage. So, to draw this line, the 
parties have to wait till the legislative stage. It is in light of this that we should 
see Rawls's postponement of the issue of disability – the information that is 
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required to deal most appropriately with it, is only available then. The 
postponement is only till a later stage of the theory, and not beyond the theory.  
 
Nussbaum’s worry may be that the postponement (to the legislative stage) 
may result in the parties considering and satisfying the claims of the non-
disabled first, and leave only the remaining resources to the disabled. There 
may then be so little left, that the claims of the disabled cannot be met 
satisfactorily. But this is not the case that Rawls intended. For Rawls, once the 
"prevalence and kinds of these misfortunes are known" at the legislative stage, 
the "costs of treating them can be ascertained and balanced along with 
government expenditure" (PL 184, emphasis mine). In Rawls's framework, 
actual political decisions are made only after all the four stages are completed. 
The principles obtained at the original position are not immediately applicable 
to society, but have to go through various stages of interpretation where they 
are tailored to fit the society in concern. What this means is that all the 
relevant claims of the disabled will have to be taken into account prior to the 
actual decisions. It is in this sense that the claims of the disabled are to be 
taken together with, and not after, the claims of the non-disabled. The worry 
that the disabled will be dealt only the "leftovers" is unfounded. If this is the 
case, then considering the claims of the disabled at the legislative stage is not 
problematic if the parties are able to ensure, as they are, that the principles that 
eventually will be applied will not exclude the disabled unfairly. In light of 
this discussion, we see that even though Rawls postponed the consideration of 
the issue of disability to the legislative stage, the set-up is "designed from the 
beginning with the disabled in mind" (Becker 2005, 17).  
 
We have established that the first criticism is not well-founded, leaving us 
with the second criticism. As it stands, the second criticism is highly general 
in nature – it neither points us to any specific details about how the theory 
exactly is inadequate to deal with cases of mental disability, nor does it show 
how exactly the act of postponement contributes to the inadequacy. In what 
follows, I will move beyond discussing the criticism at such a general level, 
and show how it is motivated by several more specific criticisms, before 
moving to assess them. In particular, they centre on the claim that there are 
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other elements of the theory that render it unable to give a satisfactory account 
of how we should relate to the mentally disabled. Here, I consider Nussbaum's 
arguments – which have been given much weight. The elements in concern are 
(1) the theory’s "commitments to the Circumstances of Justice" that assumes 
the rough equality of powers between individuals with life plans who come 
together to form a contract; (2) "the idea of mutual advantage as what makes 
cooperation superior to noncooperation" for the individuals; (3) "its use of a 
Kantian conception of the person" that deems citizens as having the two moral 
powers of rationality and reasonableness, without which reciprocity in 
cooperation is not possible (FJ 107-8). While I show that the first two are 
misplaced, the final criticism is what could potentially pose the most severe 
challenge to Rawls's theory.   
 
 Circumstances of justice 
 
Nussbaum argues the fact that Rawls's "account of why the parties prefer 
cooperation to non-cooperation, and what they are pursuing, is still a classical 
social contract account, with Hume's account of the Circumstances of Justice 
taking place of the state of nature" (FJ 119). In particular, she points to 
Rawls's description of the circumstances of justice as including as participants 
who are "roughly equal in power and capacity" (FJ 103), possess the two 
moral powers of rationality and reasonableness, and who are "fully 
cooperative members of society over a complete life" (FJ 104). Nussbaum 
thinks that Rawls's commitment to this description of the circumstances of 
justice cannot allow us to easily "extend the core idea of inviolability and the 
related idea of reciprocity to people with severe physical and mental 
impairments" (FJ 119). 
 
Nussbaum thinks that in making these assumptions, Rawls has modelled the 
initial situation from which justice arises such that it precludes cooperation 
with the disabled, who do not meet these two requirements. In this way, the 
disabled are excluded from the initial choice situation. In addition, because 
Rawls's account of primary goods "is an account of the needs of citizens who 
are characterized by the two moral powers and by the capacity to be 'fully 
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cooperating'" (FJ 109), it is bound to leave out the concerns for the disabled 
who do not meet these descriptions. It is this that leads her to say that there is a 
conflation of "two questions that are in principle distinct: ‘By whom are 
society’s basic principles designed?’ and ‘For whom are society’s basic 
principles designed?’ (FJ 16). 
 
Let us first situate this criticism within Rawls's framework. The circumstances 
of justice appear as the context within which the well-ordered society is 
embedded. With this knowledge, the parties in the original position are made 
to choose principles to organise and regulate the basic structure of the well-
ordered society. The principles that will be chosen will be sensitive to the 
conditions of the circumstances of justice. For instance, if the circumstances 
indicate an abundance of resources, the principles will turn out to be different. 
In this sense, the circumstances of justice set up the conditions for the 
principles that are eventually chosen. Nussbaum's criticism here is essentially 
that given the description of the circumstances of justice – which exclude the 
disabled – the parties eventually do not end up taking their considerations into 
account. Subsequently, the principles that result from the original position 
cannot be sensitive to the concerns of the disabled.  
 
Freeman, defending Rawls, replies by saying that Rawls "never actually says" 
(Freeman 2006, 397) that there are no ties of justice between those of unequal 
powers – refuting that the two questions are conflated. All that Rawls is 
committed to is that "relations of justice assume" (Freeman 2006, 396n79) that 
many individuals who are roughly similar in powers coexist in a definite 
location, and that their capacities comparable such that no one can dominate 
the rest. Whenever there are relations of justice, we can assume that these 
conditions would have obtained. Now, let us elaborate on this response.  
 
The circumstances of justice do not pick out the subjects of justice, but are 
intended to only constitute the necessary conditions for a system of justice, as 
a whole, to arise and succeed (Cureton, 11). Without these conditions, no 
system of justice (or in fact, even of social cooperation), can arise or succeed. 
But after it is established that a system of cooperation can arise, it is still an 
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open question whether or not the system of cooperation can subsequently 
include the disabled. Freeman is right to point out that the existence of 
relations of justice assume only the existence of individuals roughly similar in 
powers in a definite location, and that this assumption does not preclude or 
exclude individuals with disabilities, nor does it rule out beforehand their 
inclusion in the system of cooperation. There can be relations of justice 
between those of unequal powers, even if they are not initially admitted to the 
bargaining table. Nussbaum's error is that she is mistaken in thinking that the 
necessary conditions preclude the possibility of other conditions also obtaining 
in a system of cooperation. In light of this, Freeman appears correct to point 
out that Nussbaum has made "quite an unwarranted leap from what Rawls 
says, to the inference that relations of justice cannot exist between persons 
who are substantially different in natural powers and abilities" (Freeman 2006, 
397n81).  
 
 Mutual advantage 
 
Even if the circumstances of justice do not immediately exclude the disabled 
from Rawls's framework, we see that they leave as an open question whether 
or not the disabled can be subjects of justice. Here, we move to Nussbaum's 
second point, which is that the condition of mutual advantage excludes the 
disabled. She points out that according to the social contract framework (of 
which Rawls is a member), individuals would cooperate with each other only 
in "circumstances in which they can expect mutual benefit and in which all 
stand to gain from the cooperation" (2002, 137; FJ 104). Given that the parties 
are interested in pursuing their life plans, and are assumed not to have moral 
ties to each other,14 they have no reason to want to cooperate with those 
individuals who are unable to contribute at the same level (FJ 20) (if they can 
even contribute at all). She claims that: 
 
To include in the initial situation people who are unusually expensive 
or who can be expected to contribute far less than most to the well-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 In the case of Rawls, this feature is modelled as mutual disinterest (TJ 12).  
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being of the group … would run contrary to the logic of the whole 
exercise. If people are making a cooperative venture for mutual 
advantage, they will want to get together to form cooperation with 
whom they may expect to gain, not those who will demand unusual 
and expensive attention without contributing anything much to the 
social product, thus depressing the level of society's well-being. 
(FJ 104; 2002, 137) 
 
If this were correct, then systems of cooperation will have to leave out the 
disabled, from whom no one stands to benefit. However, Nussbaum claim 
rests on a misunderstanding of how Rawls uses the concept of mutual 
advantage. 
 
Freeman notes that Nussbaum is right to point out that "there is something 
misguided about the conception of social cooperation as simply mutual 
advantage," (Freeman 2006, 400) but indicates that Rawls says the same thing 
as well. Freeman points out that this view of mutual advantage is Hobbesian in 
nature, and that "[m]utual advantage in the sense relied upon by Hobbesian 
views play no role in Rawls's argument" (Freeman 2006, 400). For Rawls, 
mutual advantage does not mean that "each person must benefit from each and 
every other person as a condition of cooperating with them" (Freeman 2006, 
403). Rather, it should be understood as indicating that every participating 
member should, with social cooperation, be able to further their own life plans 
(tied to their conception of the good) significantly better than if they were in a 
state of non-cooperation, and only on "terms that are fair" (Freeman 2006, 
402). What this means is that the terms are those "that each participant may 
reasonably accept, provided that everyone else likewise accepts them" (PL 
16). As Freeman points out, this is the dimension of reciprocity within the 
notion of mutual advantage15 -- that mutual advantage should be understood as 
"a relation between citizens in a well-ordered society" (PL 17). Citizens, being 
free and equal, understand that the claims they make on one another should 
not be unreasonable, and that they should "not gain at one’s another’s 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 In fact, Freeman points out that under “Mutual advantage” in the index, Rawls says “see 
Reciprocity”. c.f. TJ 600/531. 
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expense" (TJ 104/89). This dimension of reciprocity ensures that people are 
not "coerced or exploited, or manipulated, or unfairly taken advantage of in 
some other way" (Freeman 2006, 403). The latter is what would be allowed on 
a Hobbesian view where the presence of conditions with social cooperation 
better than that without social cooperation is sufficient reason to cooperate – 
leaving room for the kinds of exploitation Rawls terms as "socially 
coordinated activity controlled by others and for others' benefit" (Freeman 
2006, 401; PL 16), and which he was eager to distance himself from, though 
Nussbaum mistakenly attributes it to him (Freeman 2006, 400-402). 
 
What this means is that Nussbaum misattributes an understanding of mutual 
advantage to Rawls, which Rawls in fact did not have. Citizens in Rawls's 
well-ordered society are not seeking to benefit from each and every person, 
but only to ensure the conditions that allow them to advance their rational plan 
of life. The exclusion of the disabled on the basis that they will not benefit 
directly from them, is not a move that the parties in the original position will 
make. Furthermore, their normally effective senses of justice will prevent 
them from treating the disabled in certain ways.  
 
In addition, given that the parties represent members in the well-ordered 
society, they must be cognisant of the fact that they are social beings who 
already stand in relation to others in society (Freeman 2006, 400-402) – 
including the disabled. Their "membership in their society is given" (PL 276). 
What work does such a statement do? We recall that the parties in the original 
position are described as representing members of a well-ordered society – 
and specifically that they know that such members have a normally effective 
sense of justice. What this means is that when they think of social cooperation 
as being there for mutual advantage, they are not understanding mutual 
advantage in the same way as Nussbaum. The social beings that Rawls 
envisaged would not think that they can exclude the disabled simply on the 
basis that it would involve great costs otherwise. For citizens with normally 
effective senses of justice, the demands of economy or efficiency do not 
outweigh the demands of justice. These relations that citizens have to each 
other act as constraints on the principles that can be chosen in the original 
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position (Freeman 2006, 142-167). The parties have to be sensitive to these 
existing relations, and cannot chose principles that demand otherwise. 
  
As with the circumstances of justice, the idea of mutual advantage also does 
not exclude the mentally disabled.  
 
 Kantian commitments 
 
We move to the third element of Rawls's theory which has been identified as 
hindering it from being able to give an adequate account of how we should 
deal with the claims of the disabled – Rawls's Kantian commitments. In 
discussing this issue, Nussbaum slides between locating the problem at the 
level of the original position, and at the level of the well-ordered society. We 
proceed to first clarify her position before seeing what threats it poses to 
Rawls. 
 
First, Nussbaum points out that for Rawls, the parties in the original position 
are described in a manner – as requiring a high degree or even idealised notion 
of rationality (FJ 64-65, 98-99, 108) – that excludes the disabled from 
participation (FJ 25-34). The sentiment here is that if they are excluded from 
participation in the original position, then their claims will not be taken into 
account. That leads to the unfortunate situation where the principles that 
emerge from the original position become inadequate in dealing with their 
claims. However, if we look closely, we see that this idealisation is one that 
excludes not only the disabled, but also most, if not all, human beings. It is a 
fact that we do not usually think of ourselves as ideally rational in our 
everyday life, nor do we deem ourselves able to attain ideal rationality. If this 
is the case, and if we are not inclined to say that Rawls was designing a theory 
for gods, and not human beings, we have to look carefully at the work that this 
idealisation does.  
 
Part of the answer lies in the fact that the assumption of ideal rationality of the 
parties in the original position performs a different function than the one 
Nussbaum thinks it does –it simply delineates the features that we think people 
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should have (or approximate) if they are to choose principles of justice for 
society. We recall that the description of the original position is intended to 
capture certain convictions about justice that we have (TJ 18/16; JF 17). In 
light of this, the idealising assumption is merely an attempt to "specify a 
situation that we, on reflection, regard as appropriate for choosing" (Cureton 
20) principles of justice. It combines "rather formal and abstract conditions" 
(CP 237), such that they capture "what we regard as morally acceptable 
restriction of reasons in arguments" (Freeman 2007, 143). In this case, the 
conditions are that certain characteristics of a person are necessary for us to 
trust the decisions that he makes – that of rationality and reasonableness. We 
think that the more fully rational and reasonable a person is, the more trust-
worthy he is in the decision he reaches. That says little about whether or not 
we think that such a person exist, or whether only persons who are similar to 
him can be subjects of justice.16  
 
This leads us to the other part of the answer, which is that exclusion from 
participation in the choice situation is not in itself a problem. In talking about 
the parties in the original position, Rawls says that they "must secure the 
fundamental interests of those they represent" (JF 84). So, even if the parties 
are ideally rational, they still have to take into account the concerns of those 
non-ideally rational persons they represent. And as long as the concerns of the 
represented persons are taken into account, it is of little issue whether they are 
included directly in the choice situation. At this point, it is worthwhile to note 
that there is no reason why we need to think of the parties as simplistically 
rational, and that they are unable to take non-ideally rational concerns into 
account. An ideally rational party in the original position could very well 
understand the motivations of the non-ideally rational citizens that she 
represents, and can subsequently make the best decisions on their basis. Ideal 
parties, if they indeed live up to their stipulation as ideally rational, should not 
have issues taking into account the concerns of those they represent, even if 
those concerns are not those that ideally rational persons would have. In light 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Here, I leave open the question whether or not such a method is viable. Specifically, I am 
not concerned with whether it is possible to have a compelling and realistic theory of justice 
while beginning from idealisations. See Simmons (2010). 
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of this, mere exclusion from the original position is not as problematic as 
Nussbaum makes it out to be. 
 
The criticism concerning Rawls's Kantian commitments is more appropriately 
located at the level of the well-ordered society, which is the second position 
that Nussbaum takes. Specifically, it claims that the "idealised picture of moral 
rationality that is used to define the citizen in the well-ordered society" (FJ 
135) poses severe difficulties for the inclusion of the claims of the mentally 
disabled.  
 
The first issue this criticism raises is that given that the mentally disabled do 
not meet the description of citizens, they are prima facie not citizens. For 
Rawls, citizens "have all the capacities that enable them to be cooperating 
members of society" (PL 20). These characteristics are that they are free and 
equal, and possess the two moral powers. The two moral powers are the 
"capacity for a sense of justice and for a conception of good" (PL 19; TJ 
505/442). Together, the two moral powers allows for citizens "to understand, 
to apply, and to act from (and not merely in accordance with) the principles of 
political justice that specify the fair terms of cooperation [and] … to have, to 
revise, and rationally to pursue a conception of the good" (JF 18n). Citizens 
are free in three different ways. First, they "conceive of themselves and of one 
another as having the moral power to have a conception of the good" (PL 30). 
Second, they "regard themselves as being entitled to make claims on their 
institutions so as to advance their conceptions of the good" (PL 32). Finally, 
they "are viewed as capable of taking responsibility for their ends" (PL 33). 
Citizens are equal in virtue of having the capacities to be cooperating members 
of society over a complete life. It should be apparent that none of these 
descriptions immediately apply to the mentally disabled as described above. 
Given that the parties in the original position only represent citizens, the 
mentally disabled are seemingly not represented. In this situation, it appears 





However, this is not the case. In the original position, the parties are already 
cognisant of the fact that they may be disabled, and they want the principles to 
be able to deal with their claims in those cases. This is seen from the fact that 
they  
 
"will want to insure themselves against the possibility that their powers 
are underdeveloped and they cannot rationally advance their interest, 
as in the case of children; or that through some misfortune or accident 
they are unable to make decisions for their good, as in the case of those 
seriously injured or mentally disturbed" (TJ 249/218-219).  
 
The implication of this is that even though the mentally disabled may not meet 
the description of citizens, their interests and claims are nevertheless taken 
into account by the parties in the original position. Rawls does not stop here. 
He adds that the parties have to ensure that they  
 
"act for [the disabled] as we would act for ourselves from the 
standpoint of the original position. [They] try to get for him the things 
he presumably wants whatever else he wants. [They] must be able to 
argue that with the development or the recovery of his rational powers 
the individual in question will accept [their] decision on his behalf and 
agree with [them] that [they] did the best thing for him" (TJ 249/219).  
 
The parties have to take the interests of the mentally disabled seriously, 
ensuring that whatever decisions they reach about their treatment have to be 
held to a certain standard of justifiability. This ensures that their claims are not 
left out, or inadequately met.  
 
We return to the three criticisms we began with – that certain elements of 
Rawls's theory contribute to it not being able to deal adequately with the 
claims of the mentally disabled. While I will later argue that the Kantian 
commitment leads to further problems that have not been pointed out exactly 
by Nussbaum, at this point it should suffice to say that these criticisms – as 
they have been raised – do not pose a severe threat to Rawls's theory. In what 
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4 Distribution woes: the first principle 
 
 Distribution of primary goods: a preliminary worry  
 
We recall that for Rawls, the parties in the original position are interested in 
designing the basic structure – via choosing principles of justice – so as to 
ensure that they have fair access to the conditions necessary for the pursuit of 
their life plans, whatever they may be. They want the primary goods in order 
to ensure that they live a complete life (JF58, among others), and the 
principles are tasked with distributing these goods. In this way, the distribution 
of resources can be said to be goal-oriented.  
 
Depending on how strictly one wants to interpret the motivations of the parties 
in the original position, the fact of distribution being goal-oriented may or may 
not be a problem. If we take the distribution of resources to be applicable if 
and only if there are life plans to be spoken of, then these resources are 
correspondingly not guaranteed for the mentally disabled who have no life 
plans. On this account, only those who are able to formulate and have life 
plans are subjects of the distribution. The mentally disabled are left out of the 
picture. While this appears to be the reading of Rawls that many critics are 
implicitly working with, it is in fact erroneous. We recall that Rawls intended 
for the disabled to be taken care of, even in instances where they are mentally 
disturbed and unable to make decisions for themselves (TJ 249/218-219). 
These are instances where the individuals in concern lack the abilities to 
formulate or pursue their life plans. Assuming that Rawls was not being 
inconsistent, this brings us to the understanding that Rawls could not have 
intended the distribution of resources to be strictly goal-oriented in this 
manner. For if it were so, then the parties would not be able to ensure that they 
would be taken care of in those circumstances. They – or their guardians – 
would simply not receive any resources to take care of them.  
 
In order to negotiate this tension between the prudentiality of the parties and 
the goal-orientation of the distribution of resources, we have to take a less 
strict reading of the relationship between the existence of life plans and the 
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distribution of resources. In doing so, there is room for it to be an open 
question whether or not the conditions are guaranteed. While there does not 
appear to be anything within Rawls's works that can settle the question of 
which reading to take conclusively, but it seems safe to take the second, less 
restrictive reading – which keeps to the letter of Rawls's statements, without 
actually disagreeing with them.17 In addition, we should take this reading 
because the project here is to examine whether or not Rawls's framework has 
resources to give us adequate answers to the question of how to deal with the 
claims of the disabled. If we were to take the more restrictive reading, we have 
no more reason to proceed further with our enquiry. This forestalls any 
possibility of locating any resources within Rawls, and indeed obviates the 
necessity of even embarking on this project. Insofar as we are interested to see 
what the best Rawlsian answers are, it is premature to stop short because of an 
open interpretative question. The better way to proceed is to begin with the 
less restrictive reading – which allows the project to proceed. If, even on this 
reading, Rawls's framework is unable to give us satisfactory answers to our 
treatment of the disabled, then we will have a much stronger conclusion about 
its inadequacies than if we were to cut short our project right from the start. In 
what follows, I will look closely at Rawls's framework, in order to reconstruct 
what it says about what to give to the disabled. I will consider what Rawls 
explicitly says, as well as what he implies, about distribution of primary goods 
to the disabled. The discussion will be situated in accordance with Rawls's 
lexicographical ordering of them. Specifically, I will consider what each of 
Rawls's principles says about meeting the claims of the mentally disabled.  
 
 The first principle of justice 
 
In this section the primary concern is with what the first principle says about 
the distribution of the primary good of basic liberties to the mentally disabled. 
Here, we begin with Freeman's response that it is "not normally an injustice to 
deny the severely mentally disabled such basic liberties" (Freeman 2006, 415). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 This is a move made by Henry S. Richardson (2006). 
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Two things have to be examined. First, it is what motivates such an answer, 
and second, what to do after that.   
 
Freeman's response seems right. The list of basic liberties Rawls provides are: 
 
"political liberty (the right to vote and to hold public office) and 
freedom of speech and assembly; liberty of conscience and freedom of 
thought; freedom of the person, which includes freedom from 
psychological oppression and physical assault and dismemberment 
(integrity of the person); the right to hold personal property and 
freedom from arbitrary arrest and seizure as defined by the concept of 
the rule of law" (TJ 61/53; PL 291). 
 
It does not appear that many of these are relevant for the mentally disabled. As 
Freeman points out, these liberties "are exercisable only if a person has 
developed moral powers and is capable of understanding his or her own 
interests" (Freeman 2006, 415). In light of the way we have characterised the 
mentally disabled, these basic liberties are irrelevant – inapplicable and of no 
use – to them. Their lives would not be made better by the incorporation of 
many of these liberties, nor would they be impoverished with their 
deprivation.  
 
A qualification has to be made. The fact that these liberties are exercisable by 
an individual only in light of her capacities to understand them, does not 
immediately lead us to the claim that they are irrelevant in the situations where 
the capacities are absent. This is because liberties can indeed be relevant to 
individuals, even if they do not have any clear conception of them.18  An 
individual may be unable, when pressed, to give an account of how a 
particular liberty is relevant to her interests, or integrate them into her existing 
interests. Yet, that does not mean that that liberty is not, in some ways, 
relevant to her. The mere fact of an individual being unable to understand her 
interests is insufficient to motivate the claim of irrelevance.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




However, our topic at hand is the mentally disabled, who not only lack the 
capacities to even have a sense of their own interests, but are also unable to 
have many of these interests in the first place. Given this, the liberties that 
serve to protect these interests cannot be said to be relevant to them. With 
regards to the mentally disabled, only the freedoms from psychological 
oppression and physical assault and dismemberment, and from arbitrary arrest 
and seizure, are immediately relevant to their interests, as we can sensibly 
construe them. Why not, then, simply ensure these liberties to them, while 
ignoring those that are not relevant to them? This partial-distribution strategy 
appears to be an easy solution to the problem here.  
 
This solution is complicated by Rawls's statements concerning the institutional 
protection of the basic rights and liberties – that it can be taken as "a condition 
of the adequate development and full exercise of the two moral powers of 
citizens as free and equal persons" (PL, 297).19 The protection of the basic 
rights and liberties constitute part of the conditions of development and 
exercise of the powers of citizens. While it is a fallacy to immediately say that 
the protection of these liberties is irrelevant to the mentally disabled who are 
unable to ever develop or exercise these powers,20 it nevertheless remains that 
there appear to be no grounds, within Rawls's framework, for protecting these 
liberties on their behalf. If we are interested in ensuring that the afore-
mentioned interests of the mentally disabled (concerning bodily integrity and 
arbitrary arrest), we have to find another basis besides the one Rawls has given 
us. The reasons for protecting these interests have to be grounded in a way 
different from the protection of basic rights and liberties.  
 
I suggest that these interests can be protected via another route. A closer look 
at Rawls's statements about the distribution of the basic rights and liberties, 
may give us a clue to what can be given to the mentally disabled within his 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 I believe this also explains, in part, Freeman's statement that it is not an injustice to deny the 
severely mentally disabled these liberties.  
20 Because Rawls did not say that the protection of these liberties is a condition only for the 
development and exercise of the moral powers, it is possible (and perfectly compatible with 
his statements) that such a protection also serves as a condition for other things. 
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framework. Rawls did not intend for the first principle to distribute basic 
liberties to citizens in a purely formal manner, but in a way that actually 
contributes to the conditions for the pursuit of their life plans. In many 
circumstances – such as extreme poverty – the basic rights and liberties may 
be worth very little to their possessors (TJ 204/179). In these circumstances, 
individuals cannot be said to have basic rights and liberties in a substantive 
sense. In response to this, Rawls says that  
   
"the first principle covering the equal basic rights and liberties may 
easily be preceded by a lexically prior principle requiring that citizens’ 
basic needs be met, at least insofar as their being met is necessary for 
citizens to understand and to be able fruitfully to exercise those rights 
and liberties. Certainly any such principle must be assumed in applying 
the first principle" (PL 7, emphasis mine; c.f. JF 44).  
 
Rawls did not elaborate too much on what he thought to be basic needs, except 
to note that the basic needs must constitute the requirements that “must be met 
if citizens are to be in a position to take advantage of the rights, liberties and 
opportunities of their society” (LP 38), and include “economic means as well 
as institutional rights and freedoms” (LP 38). It is safe to assume that he was 
referring to the basic needs of human beings. These are things such as shelter, 
subsistence, protection, and the like. The satiation of the basic needs of the 
citizens is necessary in order to preserve the value of the basic rights and 
liberties. The latter constitute the conditions for the pursuit of citizens’ life 
plans. If citizens merely have these rights and liberties, without being able to 
exercise them due to the fact that their basic needs are not even minimally 
met, then they are said to possess these rights in a merely formal sense, 
without being able to fruitfully exercise them to pursue their life plans. That 
defeats the purpose of the first principle, and is not something that Rawls 
would have wanted.  
 
This response is relevant to our considerations for the mentally disabled in an 
important way. If it were true that the fulfilment of basic needs is lexically 
prior to the granting of basic liberties, then at first look it appears as though 
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the disabled can be granted these basic needs, while not the basic liberties. 
This appears to be a plausible solution – the basic needs, insofar as they refer 
to the basic needs of human beings, are definitely relevant to the mentally 
disabled. That the basic structure (via the first principle) ensures that their 
basic needs are met is a good step towards ensuring that they will not, as 
Nussbaum claims, be "excluded and stigmatized", and "hidden away in 
institutions to die from neglect" (FJ 15).  
 
However, a more careful look at the wording of the passage points us to a 
further complication. Rawls formulated the provision of basic needs as those 
that have to be met in order "for citizens to understand and to be able fruitfully 
to exercise" the basic liberties, for the pursuit of life plans (PL 7). Like the 
basic liberties, the provision of basic needs is goal-oriented – and we run into 
the same problem that we faced earlier. Here, we are less ready to say that we 
can deny the mentally disabled their basic needs. However, what grounds 
would there be, within Rawls's framework, for this answer? 
 
The first is to look to Rawls's statement that that in cases where individuals 
lack the two moral powers,21 "it would be unwise in practice to withhold 
justice on this ground [lacking the two moral powers]. The risk to just 
institutions would be too great" (TJ 506/442-443). Rawls did not elaborate on 
this response, but it is clear that he did not intend for the severely mentally 
disabled to be left out of the scope of justice. I suggest that we can clarify this 
statement via an analogy to Immanuel Kant's position on how we cannot 
mistreat animals on pain of facing greater risks. It should then become clear 
why this is a poor response to our problem. Kant makes the following 
argument: 
 
If a man shoots his dog because the animal is no longer capable of 
service, he does not fail in his duty to the dog, for the dog cannot 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Rawls mentions that the capacity for moral personality [possessing the two moral powers] is 
a sufficient condition for being entitled to equal justice" (TJ442/505). This means that many 
mentally disabled individuals will indeed be included – more than what critics think. 




judge, but his act is inhuman and damages in himself that humanity 
which it is his duty to show towards mankind. If he is not to stifle his 
human feelings, he must practice kindness towards animals, for he who 
is cruel to animals becomes hard also in his dealings with men. (Kant 
1997, 240) 
 
Rawls's response can be seen as structurally analogous to Kant's response – in 
the case of the mentally disabled, we have to include them on pain of stifling 
our sense of justice. Presumably, if we were to exclude the claims of the 
mentally disabled from the scope of justice (in this case, basic needs), then 
that would set off a bad precedent and we may eventually begin to exclude 
other people who are not disabled. The underlying idea is presumably that we 
should not risk engaging in activities that can taint the purity of our sense of 
justice. Being structurally analogous, such a response bears exactly the same 
problem that Kant's clearly faces – which is that it fails to capture what exactly 
is wrong with mistreating the mentally disabled. When we deny the mentally 
disabled their basic needs, what we need to worry about is not the risk that will 
be posed by our actions to just institutions; we should be focused on the wrong 
that we do to them as beings. In addition, it paints an erroneous picture of our 
relationship to the mentally disabled. On this account, they are not considered 
direct subjects of justice, but are only included for reasons not concerning 
them – they are not seen as equally deserving justice. If this were operative in 
our decision not to deny the mentally disabled their basic needs, then it to a 
certain extent, we see ourselves as being held hostage by them. To draw an 
analogy, it would be akin to a child refusing to lie on the basis of his fear of 
reprimand, rather than his belief that it is the right thing to do. This cannot be a 
position that we should be taking with regards to them. Additionally, an 
unfortunate implication of this picture is that there is nothing else to prevent 
the denial of basic needs to the mentally disabled should it be ascertained that 
there would be no subsequent risk or unhappy consequences. On the whole, 
this response is inadequate for our purposes. 
 
Next, we turn to the earlier-mentioned prudence of the parties to ensure that 
they are still taken care of in circumstances where they are unable to do so 
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themselves (TJ 249/218-219). In particular, the mentally disabled are treated 
in ways that they can accept, upon "the development or the recovery" of their 
cognitive powers (TJ 249/219). Our earlier, preliminary conclusion with 
regards to this was that this ensured that the interests of the mentally disabled 
would be taken into account in the design of the principles and basic structure. 
On a closer look to determine how it plays a role in giving us the grounds for 
ensuring that the basic needs of the mentally disabled are fulfilled, we run into 
some difficulties. 
 
Part of the initial difficulty with applying this consideration to the mentally 
disabled is the fact that they are unable to ever develop or recover their mental 
powers to accept or reject the decisions that we make on their behalf. The idea 
of acceptability of our treatment of them does not apply to them directly. 
Consequently, saying that we have to get for them the things that they will 
agree to with the development or recovery of their mental powers gives us no 
determinate answer. The constraint – that whatever we choose for them needs 
to fulfil the requirement of their hypothetical consent – leaves open all 
possibilities with regards to their treatment. Consequently, any judgement that 
we make for them must have as its basis what we think is good for them – not 
anything that they actually have any say in. On its own, such an argument does 
not pose a severe problem yet – for it is the case that the mentally disabled are 
dependent on others for their functionings, and that decisions made are always 
decisions made without any possibility of rational acceptance or rejection on 
their part. The demand that the decisions we make on their behalf be 
justifiable to them, on their own terms (whatever that may be), sets up an 
impossible standard that presents no possibility of its fulfilment. If we are not 
to be crippled by these worries, it appears that we have to move along and take 
it as unproblematic that we decide on their behalf.  
 
The argument only poses a more serious problem when we include the worry 
that the parties in the original position, as well as the citizens in a well-ordered 
society, will think otherwise – that the severely mentally disabled should be 
“excluded and stigmatized”, and “hidden away in institutions to die from 
neglect” (FJ 15), instead of having their basic needs provided for. This is a 
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situation that mirrors, unfortunately, the grounds of our treatment of animals – 
they cannot in principle accept or reject our treatment, so what is there to 
prevent us from ill-treating them? With the current resources that we have, ill-
treatment is not an option that we can prevent.  
 
One of the most immediate solution is to describe the parties as representing 
guardians or trustees of the mentally disabled. However, before I consider how 
exactly this might resolve our problem, I first respond to Nussbaum's claim 
that such a response is "unavailable to Rawls" (FJ 136), for the reason that it 
would "require them to know that they do have benevolence [towards the 
mentally disabled] and how strong it is" (FJ 137)22 – something that Rawls 
explicitly ruled out in the original position, for fear of complicating the theory 
unnecessarily (TJ 149/129). 
 
Freeman responds to Nussbaum's claim by pointing out that  
 
"the restriction on benevolence in the original position means the 
parties are to be mutually disinterested towards other parties within the 
original position. It does not mean that they should have no benevolent 
concerns for anyone; on the contrary they should assume that as 
(representatives of) members of a well-ordered society they (or those 
they represent have benevolent concerns of many kinds" (Freeman 
2006, 416-417). 
 
In the original position, the parties are assumed to be working for the interests 
of those they represent, without being interested in furthering the interests of 
other parties, who represent other individuals. This leaves open the possibility 
that the individuals they represent can indeed be guardians or trustees of the 
mentally disabled – in that way, the interests of the mentally disabled can enter 
the parties' considerations. This coheres with Rawls's understanding that the 
lack of benevolence in the parties does not mirror a similar lack in the citizens 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Nussbaum provides three reasons for why she thinks the guardianship option is unavailable 
to Rawls. However, two of them arise from a misreading of Rawls's ideas of mutual advantage 
and description of the parties in the original position – already discussed above. Hence, I do 
not discuss those criticisms. 
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that they represent, noting that "the motivation of the parties in the original 
position does not determine directly the motivation of people" in a well-
ordered society (TJ rev., 128)23. When we see the lack of benevolence together 
with the veil of ignorance from the point-of-view of the parties, we come to 
the realisation that because they do not know who they may represent, they 
will be forced "to take the good of others into account" (TJ 148/128-129), 
including those who are guardians of mentally disabled individuals. So even 
though they are not described as directly concerned with the mentally 
disabled, they can still acknowledge that those they represent can be. It is in 
this sense that the guardianship solution is available to Rawls, even if he 
describes the parties in the original position as not having benevolence to other 
parties.  
 
This resolves our initial worry – that the parties in the original position may 
decide to ignore the claims of the mentally disabled – by pointing out that the 
parties, representing guardians of the mentally disabled, can take the interests 
of the mentally disabled into account. Yet this resolution is only partial, for the 
worry can arise again at the level of the guardians of the mentally disabled in 
the well-ordered society. We can reiterate our initial worry as follows: given 
the mentally disabled are dependent on others for decisions made about their 
lives, there is nothing yet in Rawls to stop their guardians or caretakers from 
thinking that they should be left to die. If indeed the guardians do not have the 
interests of the mentally disabled in mind, then positing that the parties 
represent guardians does little work in actually ensuring that their claims are 
met.  
 
We look to Rawls's notion of a well-ordered society for a solution. Here, the 
explanation can be that the citizens have a normally effective sense of justice, 
and that they accept the constraints of any regulative principles of justice. If 
this is the case, then presumably the citizens will not act in manners contrary 
to their senses of justice. The maltreatment of the mentally disabled appears to 
be an option foreclosed to them.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




However, if we look to Rawls, we see that this response seems to get the order 
of explanation wrong. Rawls states that it is the "principles [of justice], 
together with the laws of psychology (as these work under the conditions of 
just institutions), which shape the aims and moral sentiments of citizens of a 
well-ordered society" (TJ rev., 128). What this means is that the contents of 
citizens' senses of justice and their psychologies are, in part, filled in by the 
principles of justice. Citizens' senses of justice have to always be seen in the 
context of a well-ordered society regulated by principles of justice – for those 
"taking part in these arrangements [of basic institutions] acquire the 
corresponding sense of justice and desire to do their part in maintaining them" 
(TJ 454/398). It is the particular arrangement of the basic institutions (via the 
principles) that "cultivates" the sense of justice as well as "the aims that it 
encourages" (TJ 454/398). Given that the task at hand is to find the grounds, 
within Rawls's framework, for the principles to ensure that the basic needs of 
the mentally disabled are fulfilled, pointing towards the contents of citizens' 
sense of justice ends in a circularity. Prima facie, this response answers the 
question "what grounds are there for the principles to ensure that the basic 
needs of the mentally disabled are fulfilled?" with the answer "the principles 
ensure that the basic needs of the mentally disabled are fulfilled".  
 
Similarly, the appeal to the laws of psychology fails. Rawls understood the 
moral development that leads to these laws of psychology as being rooted in 
"many kinds of learning ranging from reinforcement and classical 
conditioning to highly abstract reasoning and the refined perception of 
exemplars" (TJ 461/404).24 These kinds of activities are also situated in a 
society that the citizens find themselves in. If this is the case, then appealing to 
the psychologies of citizens in a well-ordered society for answers when the 
question is whether or not the citizens in a well-ordered society will have 
those psychologies runs into an explanatory circularity that does little work in 
resolving our question. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Rawls's elaboration of how exactly they are instantiated is found in Chapter 8 of TJ. 
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To adequately block out the possibility of ill-treatment of the mentally 
disabled – that their basic needs are not taken care of – we need to go beyond 
bringing in purely formal elements of Rawls. In particular, we cannot look 
simply at the relationships between different elements of his theory, but have 
to look at the substantive assumptions that Rawls made about their content. 
This is a move that Rawls's himself pointed to, but which has been under-
emphasised in discussions. Rawls claims,  
 
“it is obviously impossible to develop a substantive theory of justice 
founded solely of truths of logic and definition. The analysis of moral 
concepts and the a priori, however traditionally understood, is too 
slender a basis. Moral theory must be free to use contingent 
assumptions and general facts as it pleases. There is no other way to 
give an account of our considered judgements in reflective 
equilibrium” (TJ 51/44).  
 
The force in this statement lies in it giving warrant to our appeal to substantive 
assumptions about the fact of things in the world. An elaboration of this will 
not only resolve our worries about the guardians of the mentally disabled not 
having their interests at heart, but also give us a powerful response to the 
earlier question of whether the basic needs of the mentally disabled will be 
guaranteed even as they cannot even make use of the basic rights and liberties 
to pursue their life plans.  
 
We recall that Rawls's theory is intended to be a systematic articulation of our 
convictions about justice, instead of a purely formal project that elucidated 
concepts pertaining to justice (TJ 577-587/506-514). In particular, we have to 
see him as starting and working from a “fund of implicitly shared ideas and 
principles” the “content of which is at least familiar and intelligible to the 
educated common sense of citizens generally” (PL 14). Rawls begins in mediis 
rebus (Dreben 2003, 322) – in the middle of things – drawing from 
convictions as and when they are available and generalisable to citizens in 
society. What this means is that he begins by assuming certain things as true – 
in this case, the contents of the senses of justice of the citizens in a well-
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ordered society. We have seen the consequences of not being able to do that – 
which is that we will have no answer to the problems that we face. The gap 
between what the purely formal can give us, and what we want it to give us, 
can only be bridged by an appeal to the contingent yet important substantive 
contents of our convictions.  
 
Returning to the problem we are facing, we see that we are warranted, in our 
proposed solution via guardianship, in appealing to the content of citizens' 
sense of justice as indeed including the concern for the mentally disabled. 
While this assumption may not have been true just decades ago, it does not 
appear to be a controversial assumption for this day and age. Because of this, 
the guardians of the mentally disabled will not leave them to die, and will 
want to ensure that their basic needs are taken care of. With this in hand, we 
can forestall the earlier worry that the guardians of the mentally disabled may 
not be concerned about their interests, and instead leave them to die. It is 
simply not something that they would do, or would find acceptable. 
 
In light of this, the earlier remark – that the content of citizens' senses of 
justice are shaped by the principles – also has to be re-understood. On this 
picture, citizens are not abstract and isolated entities lacking senses of justice, 
and awaiting the principles to confer them those senses. Rather, we can 
understand the situation as one where the citizens already have certain 
substantive contents of their senses of justice present from the start – the 
principles of justice exist simply to specify the exact ways those relations are 
instantiated. For instance, we can say that citizens have certain substantive 
concerns for the disabled, while leaving it open to the dictates of principles of 
justice to shape how those concerns are instantiated in a well-ordered society. 
On this account, we can say that the principles shape the contents of citizens' 
senses of justice, without having to also commit ourselves to the unintuitive 
picture that citizens do not have any sense of justice prior to the principles.  
 
Our appeal to contingent yet substantive assumptions to fill in the gaps should 
not unsettle us, and we should not take it that we are building a theory of 
justice from contingent premises that have little ground beyond the fact that 
46 
 
we simply hold on to them right now. On Rawls' larger framework of the 
method of reflective equilibrium, these convictions have a “central place” (TJ 
52/45), for they are “what all parties to the discussion hold in common” (TJ 
580/508), and are stable points we can rely on in our justification of the 
principles of justice. In addition, if eventually the principles of justice do not 
cohere with and explain these convictions, they will have to be sent back to 
the drawing board for revision. The grounding for principles of justice lies in 
its relationship with the convictions that shape them.  
 
A side note. This move presents us with both a solution and a worry – that 
while at this point it can help us to resolve the issue at hand, it may come to 
pass that one day the parties in a discussion of political principles no longer 
hold in common certain sentiments about how they ought to treat the mentally 
disabled. If this were indeed the case, then again there would be no guarantee 
that the principles of justice that emerge from their discussion can adequately 
meet the claims of the disabled. This is a genuine worry – and perhaps one that 
motivates Nussbaum's sentiment that we need to begin with a "richer, more 
moralized way" (FJ 14) when thinking about political principles. However, 
this is not a worry that needs concern us at this very point, where the issue is 
whether or not Rawls's theory, as it stands in conjunction with the sentiments 
we do in fact hold, is able to adequately account for the claims of the mentally 
disabled. How different, terrible futures may instantiate is, luckily, irrelevant 
to our current discussion.  
 
Once we recognise this, we open up the possibility of another element of 
Rawls's theory that can be employed in resolving the question of whether the 
basic needs of the mentally disabled should be met, even as they lack life 
plans. This is the element of human rights – which Freeman also appeals to in 
his defence of Rawls against Nussbaum's criticisms. Human rights are those 
rights we accord to persons generally regardless of whether "they have certain 
moral and intellectual powers" (LP 68), or if they are able to contribute to 





"the right to life (to the means of subsistence and security); to liberty 
(to freedom from slavery, serfdom, and forced occupation, and to a 
sufficient measure of liberty of conscience to ensure freedom of 
religion and thought); to property (personal property); and to formal 
equality as expressed by the rules of natural justice (that is, that similar 
cases be treated similarly)" (LP 65).   
 
It is apparent that human rights – as they are defined by Rawls – can stand in 
for what we think of as encompassed by the idea of basic needs. The meeting 
of these human rights – especially the right to the means of subsistence and 
security – appears to guarantee the substantive worth of the basic rights and 
liberties in the same ways that the basic needs do. They are "recognized as 
necessary conditions of any system of social cooperation" (LP68, emphasis 
mine). If citizens all recognise and agree that human rights should be accorded 
to everyone qua human beings, then it appears that basic needs will be 
correspondingly met. This option was closed off to us earlier. Before the 
acknowledgement that we can appeal to substantive assumptions about what 
people do believe in, the notion of human rights was insufficient as a basis for 
principles to ensure that the basic needs of the mentally disabled are met – for 
they, too, seemed to call for a deeper grounding. However, in light of what we 
can appeal to, human rights are re-interpreted as ideas that people actually 
hold on to, about how human beings should be treated, qua human beings. 
Here, the appeal to what people hold on to is sufficient as a basis to ground 
human rights, which subsequently does enough work to give us the answers 
we want regarding meeting the basic needs of the mentally disabled.  
 
The warrant to appeal to substantive assumptions should also quell our worry 
that not all the human rights on the list are immediately applicable to the 
mentally disabled who do not possess the moral powers to formulate and 
pursue their life plans. Where we earlier ran into further justificatory issues in 
trying to determine how to ensure that the mentally disabled are given 
resources irrelevant to them, we now can simply assume that the citizens of 
the well-ordered society will only grant the disabled those resources which are 
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relevant to them. This has the additional benefit of being explanatorily clear-
cut.  
 
A worry: is this one assumption too many? It seems that constantly deeming 
the resolutions to difficult questions as lying in what we can assume about 
people is not only risky (because possibly false), but also intellectually lazy. It 
is a move that seems to stop inquiry too short, and too quickly. It appears that 
the difficult questions are resolved simply on the force of assuming that they 
do not even arise as problems. Here, I think that whether or not such an 
assumption is warranted turns on whether or not it is actually true. If it were 
indeed true that the citizens in a well-ordered society would be in agreement 
about how to negotiate the demand to meet the human rights of the mentally 
disabled, even as not all of them are directly applicable, then making that 
assumption should not worry us. If, however, the veracity of this assumption is 
unclear, then the appeal to it should rightly concern us. In light of the current 
global situation – in which there is much discussion about how to meet the 
claims of the mentally disabled, and in which there is an increasing awareness 
of what exactly counts as meeting those claims25 – I believe that we can be 
optimistic about the work that this assumption can do.  
 
In any case, the fact that the resolutions to some questions raised against 
Rawls's theory lie in what we can safely assume about the world points us to a 
certain slack in his theory. Yet this is not a slack that should worry us – for 
Rawls himself intended that his theory matched the realities of the world it is 
situated in. It is via these gaps – that require substantive assumptions in order 
to be filled in – that Rawls saw his theory as possessing the possibility of 
being stable, because in accordance with what people actually believed in.  
 
We are now equipped with the resources we need in order to respond to our 
original question for the basis of the principles of justice to ensure that the 
basic needs of citizens with mental disability are taken care of. The basis has 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Especially clear in the work of the United Nations recently establishing a Secretariat for the 




three aspects: first, prudentially, the parties in the original position will want to 
ensure that their guardians will take care of their basic needs should they be 
mentally disabled; second, via an appeal to substantive assumptions, we see 
that the guardians will indeed ensure that their basic needs are taken care of; 
third, these assumptions are filled in partially by the idea of human rights. This 
brings us to the conclusion that the principle of justice regulating basic needs, 
insofar as it needs to cohere with the convictions that citizens hold on to, 
eventually has to ensure that the basic needs of the mentally disabled are taken 
care of. This holds true, even as the mentally disabled are not granted basic 




5 Distribution woes: the second principle 
 
Given that the basic needs of the mentally disabled will be taken care of, the 
subsequent question is how Rawls's framework specifies the nature of these 
basic needs. This ties in with the second criticism of Rawls's framework we 
discussed earlier, which concludes that the principles arrived at via 
considering the non-disabled will not be adequate in responding to the claims 
of the disabled. Specifically, the question is about what Rawls's framework 
gives in order to fulfil the basic needs of the mentally disabled. Should they be 
in terms of primary goods, capabilities, or functionings? There are many who 
think that this space is best filled in by the capabilities, but rather than opting 
for an element extraneous to Rawls's theory, we are interested to see how the 
concept of primary goods might be elaborated to fulfil this role – or if it fails, 
how it fails.  
 
This also coincides with Rawls's thought that the idea of basic needs should be 
specified by the primary goods, indicating that the "basic interests [of citizens] 
… [are] specified by the primary goods, which cover their basic needs" (LP 
31). In the distribution of the primary goods to the citizens, the basic needs 
should automatically be met as well – the distribution of the primary goods 
cannot cross a baseline under which the basic needs of the citizens are not met. 
If, however, it can be shown that the distribution of the rest of the primary 
goods is nevertheless inadequate in responding to the claims of the mentally 
disabled, then we will have a well-grounded criticism against Rawls's theory. 
 
We are now interested in examining the remainder of the primary goods that 
Rawls thought can be distributed in order to guarantee the fair value of the 
basic liberties via meeting basic needs. These are opportunities, income and 
wealth, and the social bases of self-respect. When we look at the most severely 
mentally disabled individuals, none of the three remainder primary goods 
seem to be relevant to them directly in terms of securing for them the basic 
needs. Insofar as we see them as completely lacking (or possessing only to a 
small, insufficient degree) the functionings required to identify with 
themselves or relate to others and their environments, we see that they are 
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unable to make use of these goods to fulfil their basic needs. In these cases, 
then the problem of the irrelevance of the primary goods seems to arise again.   
 
However, given that the most severely mentally disabled are so profoundly 
dependent on others for every-day functionings, it is not clear that there is 
much that the basic structure can provide for them which they can use directly 
anyway. In any case, on the Rawlsian framework, their interests will be taken 
care of via their guardians. Earlier on, we mentioned that the basic needs of 
the mentally disabled would be met via their guardians – we now elaborate on 
this answer. 
 
Let us consider the situation from the point of view of the guardians of the 
severely mentally disabled. For them, the well-being of their wards is central 
to them, and features in the life plans that they hold. At the same time, 
providing for their wards requires them to devote time and resources that 
could have been used to pursue the self-directed aspects of their life plans. So, 
on comparison with other individuals who possess similar amounts of primary 
goods, the guardians of the mentally disabled actually have less to pursue their 
own life plans – for they require more resources. It may appear that this is not 
a problem to Rawls's framework – especially as it is blind to the contents of 
citizens' life plans. However, this is a problem because the guardians of the 
mentally disabled often have to devote so much resources to the care of their 
wards that they find themselves in situations not unlike members of the least-
advantaged in society. For instance, a report by the Disability Services 
Commission in Western Australia concluded that " many people with 
disabilities, their families and carers are among the worst off" in society 
(Commission 2013). This is because any time spent directly caring for their 
wards is time that cannot be used to pursue functionings or opportunities 
crucial for other endeavours. On the other hand, if resources were allotted to 
hire care-givers, then those are resources that cannot be used to pursue other 
endeavours. Additionally, they "face extra costs relating to housing, transport, 
aids and equipment" (Commission 2013). It is in this way that we can see the 
guardians of the severely mentally disabled as occupying social positions close 




While I will not engage in the specifics, it should suffice to say that if indeed 
the guardians of the severely mentally disabled find themselves in positions 
close to the least-advantaged in society, then they would be taken care of. This 
is a guarantee provided to them via Rawls's framework, which focuses directly 
on the least-advantaged in society, and which strives to maximise their 
benefits. The aim is to "enable all citizens, even the least advantaged, to 
manage their own affairs within a context of significant social and economic 
equality" (Wenar 2008). The guardians of the disabled should not, under 
Rawls's framework, find themselves in positions of such inequalities where 
they are unable to pursue their own life plans fruitfully. And insofar as the 
interests of those they care for feature in their life plans, the interests of the 
disabled will be indirectly addressed by the focus on the least advantaged.  
 
Two problems arise here – that of indirectness and indeterminacy. The first is 
the indirectness of providing for the severely mentally disabled is problematic 
– because it fails to take them seriously as equals. In particular, the criticism 
goes, a just society should treat all its members as equal and worthy of direct 
respect, instead of continuing to view certain members as worthy of respect 
via their relationships to other members (FJ 131, 138).  
 
A first response is to note that the most severely mentally disabled are in fact 
profoundly dependent on others, and unable to directly make use of the 
resources we give them directly. What they can get, instead, is care from their 
guardians, who are able to make use of those resources to ensure that they are 
cared for. Insofar as they have no direct use for the resources we can give 
them, then it does not seem to be a major problem to grant them those 
resources via their guardians. The indirectness of the provision of resources 
appears not to be so serious a problem.  
  
The second response is that in ensuring secure conditions for their guardians to 
pursue their life plans, without them being put at risk due to lack of resources, 
the basic structure accords the most severely mentally disabled respect – via 
acknowledging that they are important. For if they were not deemed 
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important, they would not factor in the considerations and assessments made 
about the life plans of the guardians – they may be thought of as similar to 
expensive tastes that the basic structure need not provide for. The fact that the 
basic structure ensures that the guardians have secure access to the conditions 
necessary for the pursuit of their life plans implies that it already takes the 
interests of the severely mentally disabled seriously. Lastly, the good of self-
respect is not applicable to the most severely mentally disabled, who lack the 
relevant functionings. If so, then the fact that they are accorded only indirect 
respect should not be an issue. 
 
The second problem is that of indeterminacy – that providing for the mentally 
disabled via their guardians does not tell us exactly how much or what to give 
them. The situation is a little easier to resolve in the case of the most severely 
mentally disabled. If we are interested in providing for their basic needs, then 
the guardians should be granted enough such that they can meet them and still 
have secure conditions to pursue their own life plans. Preliminarily, we can 
conclude that as it pertains to mentally disabled individuals who lack the two 
moral powers completely, the guardianship solution is both possible and 
feasible. 
 
Up to this point, we have only discussed the mentally disabled who lack the 
two moral powers completely, and are unable to formulate and pursue their 
life plans. However, when we come to cases of the mentally disabled who 
possess the two moral powers incompletely – let's call them the moderately 
mentally disabled – the situation becomes complicated exponentially. In these 
cases, the guardianship solution is inadequate – for the reason that the 
moderately mentally disabled are able to make use of the primary goods 
directly, and interact with people and their environments in ways that can 
contribute to the social good. Indirect distribution via their guardians would 
fail to take their moral personality seriously, and commits the disrespect that 
was earlier mentioned. This is especially so given that self-respect is in fact a 




Before we enter the discussion of what exactly to do with regards to the 
moderately mentally disabled, we first must settle the issue of the contribution 
of the moderately mentally disabled to the social good. This is because Rawls 
stated that "all who cooperate [in contributing to the social good] must benefit, 
or share in common burdens" (CP 316). Depending on how we understand this 
claim, one of the possible implications is that the moderately mentally 
disabled do not benefit, for they do not cooperate in contributing to the social 
good. If we, however, establish that the moderately mentally disabled are able 
to partake in cooperative endeavours, and are direct subjects of the distribution 
of resources, then we have a strong motivation to reassess the suitability of 
those resources in addressing their claims. 
 
A side-note before we proceed. It can be said that we need not go via the route 
of determining the status of the mentally disabled as contributors, if we are 
interested in ensuring that they will be subjects of direct distribution of the 
primary goods.  Such a claim finds its grounds in extending Rawls's 
statements about bad luck and the natural lottery (TJ 101-102/87) to the 
mentally disabled. In particular, the moderately mentally disabled are those 
who have fared poorly in the natural lottery of talents, and should be on the 
receiving end of "compensating advantages" (TJ 102/87).26 This move is 
immediately plausible. Not only is it consistent with Rawls's intention to 
mitigate the effects of the arbitrary natural lottery,27 but also falls in line with 
Rawls's statements that the difference principle is an "agreement to … 
alleviate as far as possible the arbitrary handicaps resulting from our initial 
starting places in society" (CP 140). 
 
However, such a move is not entirely adequate for our purposes. The 
recognition that brute bad luck needs to be compensated is an incomplete 
picture of the grounds for the inclusion of the mentally disabled. This is 
especially so, given that they are quite different from the 'normal' citizens who 
contribute to the social good. Prima facie, they do not appear to contribute to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Many thanks to Prof. Ten Chin Liew for highlighting this.  
27 Otherwise there will be an apparent inconsistency if Rawls does not extend his stance on the 
natural lottery to include the mentally disabled. 
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the social good at all. Including the disabled for this reason (of wanting to 
compensate for their bad luck) alone, without having a broader conception of 
contribution, may lead us to the apparent observation that the difference 
principle is indifferent to the fact of contribution. In broadening the concept of 
contribution, we not only can give a more complete picture of the inclusion of 
the disabled, but can also respond to the worry that the scheme of social 
cooperation can be taken advantage of by individuals who do not contribute to 
it. Our next step is to establish that the mentally disabled can indeed be 
included, without running into such a free-rider problem. 
 
This is a claim that has been repeatedly stated by Nussbaum, who argues that 
many mentally disabled individuals are able to contribute to the social good, 
"when society creates conditions in which they may do so" (FJ 105). Even 
though Rawls did not say much about this issue, he makes some remarks 
which can be seen as taking some steps towards giving an account of what to 
do. One of this lies in his statement that "provided the minimum for moral 
personality is satisfied, a person is owed all the guarantees of justice" (TJ 
507/443). While the most severely mentally disabled – as in Sesha – fail to 
meet this requirement, the moderately mentally disabled – Arthur and Jamie – 
clearly do. We are now confronted with a tension. On the one hand, the 
possession of the moral powers to a minimum degree is sufficient for the 
guarantees of justice, including the distribution of goods; on the other, 
contribution is required for the distribution of goods. The latter establishes 
itself as a more stringent condition on top of the former. Negotiating these two 
conditions is important if we want to say something concrete about the 
treatment of the moderately mentally disabled. However, Rawls does not 
himself offer us a way of negotiating these two conditions, and it is a lacuna in 
his theory that calls for interpretation or extension. 
 
Several strategies present themselves, each of which are purportedly consistent 
with the core ideas of Rawls's framework. Adam Cureton (2006) argues that 
the latter condition should be seen as indicating only that those who contribute 
must receive their fair share, while allowing it to be an open question whether 
or not those who do not contribute can receive them. In negotiating the tension 
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this way, Cureton manages to argue that the moderately mentally disabled 
should be direct subjects of justice. Henry Richardson (2006)28 and Cynthia 
Stark (2007) propose that the contribution condition be removed from the 
Rawlsian framework. For them, the fact of contribution is neither a necessary 
component of Rawls's theory, nor of contract theory in general. If so, then 
those who are mentally disabled can be included as part of those who are 
recipients of the distribution of goods. These are viable strategies, but are 
unfortunately not entirely consistent with each other. That there are different 
ways of interpreting Rawls on this issue, each of which is consistent with his 
project but not consistent with each other, points us to the understanding that 
Rawls's did not truly have a full answer to this issue. His sketchy remarks 
about this issue leaves open many possibilities and strategies that we can take 
up on, in attempting to resolve this issue. And given that we have already 
argued that there are no specific elements in Rawls's theory that excludes the 
mentally disabled, this should make us less ready – contrary to some critics – 
to claim that Rawls's theory on the whole is unable to deal with the problem of 
mental disability. If anything, the best that we can claim is that Rawls's theory 
is as yet unable to deal with the issue, because too little has been said. This 
should hopefully allow us to recalibrate our understanding – both of Rawls's 
framework, and of the quickness of many criticisms claiming otherwise.  
 
Looking at the three strategies present, we see that they are all plausible, but 
nevertheless leaves unanswered the question of whether or not the list of 
primary goods are adequate in addressing their claims – which is part of the 
question that we had set out to examine. Additionally, these approaches 
remain silent on the question of whether or not the moderately mentally 
disabled are able to contribute to the social good. This has the unhappy 
consequence of not directly answering to Nussbaum's claim that the disabled 
can be understood as contributing. In fact, this response neglects that part of 
the work that Nussbaum was trying to do was to argue for a different way of 
understanding how the disabled can contribute to the social good. In what 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Richardson actually argues that Rawls's arguments "do not essentially depend on any 
reciprocity premise" (2006, 427). Briefly, what this also means is that contributing in a 
reciprocal manner is not essential. 
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follows, I discuss a strategy put forward by Christie Hartley (2009) in 
negotiating the tension between contribution and moral powers, while using 
the work done by Lawrence Becker (2005) to clarify certain gaps.  
 
Hartley, in her defence of Rawls, begins by agreeing with Nussbaum that the 
mentally disabled "have the capacity to engage in cooperative projects that are 
of fundamental importance to contractualist society" (Hartley, 139). They are 
indeed able to contribute to the social good. Part of her project, then, is to 
attempt to appreciate "the numerous ways in which persons with [moderate] 
mental disabilities make substantial contributions to the creation, 
establishment, and maintenance of a society" (139).  
 
To do this, Hartley examines the concept of cooperation, in order to show that 
the disabled qualify as co-operators. Drawing from the Oxford English 
Dictionary, she analyses the concept of cooperation as one involving 
"individuals working together for a common end" (143). She argues that we 
should shift our focus away from the 'common end' – the social goods that are 
produced – to paying more attention to the fact that cooperation is also about 
people working together with others. Focusing on the relational aspects of 
cooperation will then allow us to see that the mentally disabled do in fact 
partake in relationships with the non-disabled in ways that eventually 
contribute to society (147). For instance, she points out that while many 
disabled individuals are unable to take on full-time jobs in the labour market, 
many of them "cooperatively contribute to society by performing household 
work that is crucial to the family", and that these contributions "are important" 
(148). By engaging in household work, the disabled presumably free up the 
time of the other members in the family – and in doing so, contribute 
indirectly to the society.  
 
Additionally, Hartley argues that even the "capacity for engagement [among 
individuals] allows persons with mental disabilities to make cooperative 
contributions of fundamental importance" (148). Her argument begins from 
her analysis that cooperation requires "a kind of common recognition between 
individuals" (148). Individuals who come together to cooperate must first view 
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each other in a certain way – in this case, it is recognising that the other with 
whom one cooperates is "a being with whom communication is possible" 
(148). The mentally disabled, she goes on to claim, are beings with whom 
communication is possible – we are able to communicate with them, albeit 
sometimes in ways that are not entirely familiar or comfortable to us (150-
152). While I think that this is indeed plausible, I think it runs the risk of being 
too inclusive. As Hartley herself points out, grounding the distribution of 
resources in terms of the capacity of engagement may end up including many 
nonhuman animals (158-159).  
 
While she thinks of it as a "virtue" of her view that it ends up including these 
animals, it actually ends up complicating the issue of distribution in a way 
more serious than what it helps to resolve. We recall that the issue of 
distribution was not only about whether the mentally disabled were subjects of 
the direct distribution of resources, but also whether or not the resources 
(primary goods) on the list were adequate for their purposes. Insofar as the 
situation is already complex in the case of the mentally disabled with regards 
to the second part of the issue, bringing animals into the picture complicates it 
even further. In including animals, we will end up having much less 
confidence that the list of primary goods are adequate in addressing their 
claims (whatever they may be) – and may eventually have to end up revising 
or altering the list of primary goods in a way that moves us very far away from 
a theory that we take to be Rawlsian in nature. There are several other difficult 
issues involved here which I cannot adequately address. For the time being, it 
seems plausible to put Hartley's suggestion of grounding distribution in the 
capacity for engagement on hold.  
 
However, we can return to her earlier analysis of cooperation, which is that the 
mentally disabled do work together with the rest of us for a common end. I 
propose that we can make sense of this statement without having to explain it 
in terms of a capacity for engagement. This, I suggest, can be found in the 
59 
 
work of Lawrence Becker (2005), 29 whose work on understanding reciprocity 
can help us analyse the concept of contribution to a common goal. The 
concept of contribution should rightfully be analysed and elaborated on, once 
we situate it within the motivations of the parties. We recall the task of the 
parties in the legislative stage is to come up with rules and policies to govern 
the distribution of primary goods. In effect, they are to interpret the difference 
principle in a manner suitable to the level of specificity of social rules and 
policies. The abstract and general statement of the difference principle is 
inadequate for the purposes of such rules and policies, which have to be 
specific enough to give any concrete direction of what we ought to do in actual 
cases. As they attempt to interpret the difference principle as applicable to 
rules and policies, the parties will have to elaborate on what exactly counts for 
someone to be considered as contributing to the sustenance of the scheme of 
affairs that brings about the conditions for the pursuit of life plans. Given that 
the manner in which they specify these requirements has deep implications for 
who receives the benefits of social cooperation, the parties will not be content 
with working with an intuitive or under-specified notion of contribution. They 
will be pressed to specify exactly what counts as contribution. 
 
In specifying what exactly counts as contribution, the parties will have reason 
to take all relevant factors pertinent to it into account. This corresponds to 
their motivation to ensure that all those who contribute receive their fair share 
of benefits, regardless of the nature of the contribution. The parties will not 
want to stick to a simplistic account – they have incentive to include as broad 
an account of contribution as possible, for fear that upon the lifting of the veil 
of ignorance they will find themselves in situations where their efforts and 
contributions to the scheme of social cooperation are not recognised, and they 
consequently are not accorded the relevant benefits.  
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Becker (2005) understands the simplifications as related to the notion of reciprocity. 
However, I think they are most appropriately pegged to the notion of contribution, and 
specifically as it pertains to the parties’ understanding of it in the legislative stage. This is an 
idea implicit in Becker, but which has not been elaborated on. The exact location of the 
simplification, in any case, a minor dispute – the conclusions we reach are essentially similar. 
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Insofar as the parties are interested in adopting as broad a conception of 
contribution as possible, they will want to avoid several simplifications in their 
understanding of the term. Specifically, there are four dimensions of 
simplifications that the parties will want to avoid. 
 
First, the parties will want to resist thinking that cooperation has to be direct. 
When we think of contribution, we usually intuitively think of it as being 
direct – we can be said to contribute when we directly advance a common goal 
shared by us. However, this is a simplistic understanding for “in any large and 
complex social structure, a large percentage of our … behaviour is indirect, or 
round-about” (Becker 20) in their contribution to the overall scheme. At any 
point, many of our actions do not directly and explicitly contribute to the 
sustenance of the entire scheme. In daily life, most of us do not act on the 
basis that our actions have to directly contribute to sustaining the overall 
scheme. If that were the case, then vast numbers of people will be excluded as 
non-contributors – among others, philosophy students working on their 
dissertations. Insofar as we nevertheless think that such people are 
contributing to the overall scheme, we must move beyond a narrow 
understanding of it as being direct. For instance, when pressed to explain the 
contribution of philosophy departments to the sustenance of the overall 
scheme, many defend it on the terms that they help in developing certain skills 
that later, and indirectly, help in endeavours that contribute to the overall 
scheme. Insofar as the parties in the legislative stage do not know how they 
will contribute exactly to the overall scheme, they will want to ensure that the 
scope of contribution is kept as broad as possible, and includes indirect 
contributions.  
 
Given that indirect contribution has to be taken into account, the parties also 
will agree that the degree of indirectness is not a limiting factor. They do not 
draw an arbitrary line beyond which the indirectness of an individual’s 
contribution leads to his exclusion from the scheme of social cooperation. The 
motivation for not doing this is so that they do not exclude, ex ante, any 
specific life plans. For instance, academics working on political theories are 
only very indirectly contributing to the sustenance of the overall scheme. 
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Insofar as the parties in the legislative stage do not yet know the details of 
their life plans, they will want to ensure that an option like this is kept open. 
And in this case, the only way to do it is to take the indirectness of the 
contribution as irrelevant to whether or not one is considered to be 
contributing. Individuals will still be considered recipients of the benefits of 
social cooperation, however indirect their contribution. Taken together, the 
parties will ensure that possible life plans are not prematurely closed off to 
them.   
 
Second, the parties will want to ensure that the conception of contribution 
includes endeavours that do not fall within the economic sphere. This requires 
further explanation. We know that we participate in a scheme of cooperation 
in order to generate certain common goods or products. These are the products 
that are taken as the benefits of cooperation, and which require fair 
distribution. The sense here is that if citizens take time and effort to advance 
the common goal, they should be rewarded or compensated. In addition, there 
is a common assumption that whenever we think of endeavours that contribute 
to the generation of these goods, we have to look at those lying within the 
sphere of economic activity. However, on closer look, we see that there are 
more endeavours that affect the common goal, beyond those within the 
economic sphere. For instance, taking care of one’s elderly parents affect the 
overall scheme in that it relieves state institutions (part of the overall scheme) 
of some burdens – a fact often neglected but most sharply seen in cases of 
elderly citizens left to fend for themselves. If this is the case, then any effort 
that go into taking care of one’s elderly parents should be taken as 
contributing to the common goal, even if it lies outside the sphere of economic 
activity.  
 
This broadening of the conception of contribution is consistent with the 
motivation of the parties in the legislative stage, in light of the information 
they have access to. We recall that the parties in the legislative stage have 
access to the full range of general economic and social facts (TJ198/174). If 
this is the case, then they must know two important things. First, the empirical 
fact of activities lying outside the economic sphere having ramifications and 
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effects for the common goal – as in the case described above. Second, and 
more importantly, they know that endeavours within the economic sphere do 
not exist in a vacuum, but rely on endeavours and activities outside the sphere. 
For instance, without the efforts of caring parents or guardians – activities 
outside the economic sphere – the possibility of people’s engagement in 
productive economic endeavours will be diminished. The same goes for the 
activities of those many home-makers whose full-time jobs are to stay at home 
and tend to the house, children, or the elderly, while their partners engage in 
activities beyond the home. We know that the parties in the legislative stage 
do not yet know which citizen they exactly represent – they could end up 
being a homemaker, among others. In light of these two realisations, they will 
want to ensure that – as long as their activities have implications for the 
common goal – their claims on the common good are protected, regardless of 
where the domain their activities lie in. The way to doing this is to ensure that 
their activities – as long as they affect the common goal – are regarded as 
contributing to the common goal, regardless of the domain within which they 
are situated.30  
 
Third, the parties will want to ensure that they do not think of contribution as 
involving the advancement of a common goal via giving goods similar in kind 
to what others are giving. They will want to insure themselves against the 
possibility that they are advancing to the common goal, but via goods that are 
not similar in kind to what the others are giving. For instance, a cleaner 
contributes to the common goal via ensuring that the workplace is clean and 
free of clutter. If the idea of contribution were not elaborated in such a way, 
there is a real possibility that the cleaner will be deemed as not advancing the 
common goal – not contributing – and excluded from the group of recipients 
of the benefits of the common good. 
 
Fourth, the parties will want to ensure that they do not think of contribution as 
having to involve only activities of equal value. Specifically, they want to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 This is the main claim made by Susan Okin (1989).  
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ensure that they have claim to the common good regardless of the value of 
their contribution, as long as it is of some value.  
 
Now, having gone through the four simplifications that the parties in the 
legislative stage will be motivated to avoid, we are in a position to revisit our 
earlier question, on what exactly counts for someone to be considered as 
contributing to the sustenance of the overall scheme of affairs. In light of our 
discussions, we see that as long as someone is engaged in an activity, direct or 
indirect and regardless of the domain, that contributes even minimally (value) 
to the overall scheme in some manner (kind), she can be said to be 
contributing to its sustenance.  
 
In addition, this picture of contribution can also help to elaborate on an earlier 
point about respect for the most severely mentally disabled members of 
society. It is only on this picture that we can understand them as contributing 
in different and complex ways to the lives of the people around them (Francis 
2009; Silvers and Francis 2009) – and deserving of respect because of that 
(Wong 2007; 2009). Without this elaborated picture of contribution, the value 
they add to our lives can only be seen as irrelevant. 
 
Now, given that the moderately mentally disabled are in fact capable of 
contribution, we should take their interests directly into account in the 
distribution of goods, and not only indirectly. The subsequent problem arises 
about the relevance of those goods which are supposed to be distributed. This 
brings us back to the second part of the problem at the start of this chapter, 
which is about whether or not the goods that are on Rawls's list are adequate in 
addressing the claims of the mentally disabled. The task is now to find a way 
to ensure that the distribution of resources as Rawls saw it will be adequate for 
them. 
 
There are two criticisms that the list cannot be made adequate for the 
moderately mentally disabled. The first (by Nussbaum) is that it omits crucial 
goods, and the second (by Sen) is that it is inadequate as an analysis of 




Nussbaum's claim is that Rawls's list of primary goods is not relevant to the 
mentally disabled, noting that care is one of the goods that has been omitted 
from the list that Rawls provided, but which is required if we intend to give an 
adequate account of how we ought to relate to the mentally disabled (FJ 139-
140). On the face, this is a plausible account. Care is indeed, as Nussbaum 
claims, a central need of all human beings – without which many crucial 
functionings would be at stake. So, in this case, the care of the disabled should 
be something provided for by the basic structure, instead of being left to the 
charge of the guardians. However, without entering too far into the debate at 
this point about whether or not care should in fact be on the list, or whether the 
list should be changed to a list of capabilities, I will make some preliminary 
remarks about how Rawls's framework can account for the same thing that 
Nussbaum wants for the most severely mentally disabled, without having to 
move to include care on the list of primary goods directly.  
 
I argue that care in the way Nussbaum envisages should not be added to the 
list of primary goods. The first is that even though care is central to many 
crucial functionings, especially in moments of dependency, it is instantiated in 
many forms dependent on specific conceptions of the good. Insofar as Rawls 
was interested in ensuring that the basic structure was not prejudiced against 
any particular conception of the good, the list of primary goods cannot be tied 
to any one particular conception of the good. If care were to make it onto the 
list, then it would have to be of a form neutral to all conceptions of the good.31 
Presumably, it would contain the provision of goods that are relevant to all the 
disabled – such as bodily subsistence and absence from harm or unnecessary 
pain, or the like. Yet, if this were the case, then the only notion of care here 
does not look too far removed from the primary goods which Rawls offered. 
At first glance, there is no reason why the primary goods are inadequate in 
addressing these minimal claims. They appear to be versatile enough for these 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 While Rawlsian responses have always been that the notion of care that Nussbaum 
advocated is in fact tied to a particular conception of the good, it is not a debate that I will 




purposes. For instance, income and wealth can be used to employ care-givers 
for the mentally disabled, instead of being given directly to them.  
 
I suspect this is not entirely what Nussbaum was talking about when she spoke 
of care for the disabled. As she presented her case, it was apparent that she 
was also talking about the kind of genuine care that people in society have 
towards the disabled. If so, then it is less clear that money or the primary 
goods that Rawls listed can be used to solve the problem. But such a 
conclusion seems to be working with a simplistic picture of Rawls. While it is 
clear that no amount of money can buy genuine care from others, it is not clear 
that Rawls was committed to such a simplistic picture. Easily, money can be 
spent on educational programmes or campaigns that serve to educate the non-
disabled, or to alleviate the conditions that disabled people live in – both of 
which are instances of care. In fact, if we consider how we want to organise 
the basic structure in order to ensure that there is genuine care for the disabled, 
education and raising public awareness seems to be the solution. This is 
because providing genuine care for the disabled is not something that the basic 
structure can give directly anyway. The analogous case we can look to is 
Rawls's position on self-respect – that it is not given directly, but via the 
organisation of the basic structure and the distribution of the goods (TJ §67). If 
this is the case, then the insistence on providing care as a primary good 
appears redundant. 
 
An objection can be raised to this response. Once we look at it from the 
perspective of the parties in the original position as Rawls described it – and 
the analogy between care and self-respect fractures. On Rawls's picture, the 
primary goods can contribute to self-respect because it has been stipulated that 
the parties are concerned with ensuring that the organisation of the basic 
structure with its corresponding distribution of goods secures the worth of 
self-respect for each citizen. But it is not the same for the notion of care. 
Insofar as the parties have not been told that care is a central good, and insofar 
as they are not told that the way they organise the basic structure needs to 
ensure the good of care for each citizen, it is difficult to see how the resultant 
structure can ensure that coincidentally ensure it anyway. Without the 
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stipulated goal, genuine care may or may not be secured for each citizen. In 
addition, even if it were not secured, Rawls's framework may still be silent on 
its lack. Again, this points us towards a lacuna in the framework for which 
additional elaboration or interpretation is required. Perhaps it can be argued 
that what is sought after in the concept of care is adequately covered by the 
concept of self-respect – something which is, at first glance, intuitive. In 
having the basic structure grant each citizen self-respect, it can be said to be 
caring for them in a manner that is thin enough to be acceptable across 
individuals with different comprehensive doctrines, while being thick enough 
to ensure that the citizens see their lives as worth living and their projects as 
worthwhile. Of course, this depends on much more work (which I cannot 
adequately address here), and is also a claim for which Rawls's framework 
does not immediately offer us an answer. And in this respect, it fails to give us 
an adequate account of the treatment of the (moderately mentally) disabled. 
Again, a note has to be made: that the inadequacy pertains only to an as yet 
under-elaborated element of Rawls's theory, and is not lethal to his theory as a 
whole.  
 
The second criticism of the primary goods also begins with the claim that 
Rawls's primary goods are irrelevant to the moderate mentally disabled, but 
ends with the more serious claim that the entire list is inadequate as a measure 
of disadvantage. Now, we recall that Rawls intended for the primary goods to 
account for the claims of everyone who has claims, in that they constitute the 
general conditions required by everyone to pursue their life plans, whatever 
they may be. Interpersonal comparisons are made in terms of people’s 
expectations of primary goods – how much of the goods they can expect to 
receive, given their position in society. The higher one’s expectations of 
primary goods, the more one “can generally be assured of greater success in 
carrying out their intentions and advancing their ends, whatever these ends 
may be” (TJ 92/79). However, if the primary goods are irrelevant to the 
moderately mentally disabled, then it cannot be that the former can be a good 
measure of how successful individuals are in advancing their ends. The 
disabled cannot advance their plans using the goods, even if they had plenty of 




Amartya Sen (1979) and Kenneth Arrow (1973) mounted one of the earliest 
versions of this criticism of the primary goods. In particular, they argued that 
the primary goods are insensitive to variances in capabilities or characteristics 
of people in the population. The critique can be brought into sharper relief if 
we consider the following scenario: 
 
Pregnancy: Two people possess similar amounts of primary goods. 
However, one of them is pregnant, and requires more nutrition than the 
other. She has to spend more resources on nutrition than the other, and 
has less to pursue her own life plan.   
 
Sen’s and Arrow’s claim is that the relationship that Rawls draws between the 
amount of primary goods and one’s success in her pursuit of ends is 
misleading. The latter is not affected solely by former, but also by the 
individual’s capabilities to make use of those goods to further her ends. In the 
Pregnancy case, the pregnant woman will be less successful in pursuing her 
ends with the same amounts of primary goods, even as she has the same 
amount of primary goods. Insofar as Rawls draws a simplistic relationship 
between the primary goods and one’s success in one’s pursuit of ends, he 
seems doomed to neglect cases like this. 
 
Rawls responds to the criticism with the following: 
 
“… an index of primary goods is not intended as an approximation to 
what is ultimately important as specified by any comprehensive 
doctrine with its account of moral values. Indeed, it must not be so 
understood in view of its role in a political conception” (CP 456). 
 
This response has been deemed weak, for it does not appear to directly address 
the critique that the relationship drawn between the primary goods and one’s 
success in pursuing ends neglects variances in a person's abilities to make use 
of them (Nelson 2008, 108). However, on closer look, it does more work than 
it appears to do. To understand this, we need to recall that for Rawls, the 
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primary goods are "clearly not intended as a measure of … well-being" (PL 
187-188). For Rawls, well-being pertains to the success one has in one’s 
pursuit of life plans. Now, an individual’s success in her pursuit of life plans is 
influenced by factors beyond the primary goods – something Rawls allows for. 
 
If this is the case, then we should see Rawls's understanding of the relationship 
between the primary goods and the success of one’s pursuit of life plans as 
follows: the former is necessary for the latter, but insufficient. Let us consider 
the motivations for this, and, in doing so, we shall see how it constitutes a 
response in the Pregnancy case as well as cases of disability. The point is that 
Rawls wanted to leave open other factors to come into play between the point 
of having the primary goods, and one’s subsequent success in the pursuit of 
ends. These factors were intended to be tied to various comprehensive 
doctrines of the good, but also could be accidents or variances in abilities. 
These factors constitute the manner that the primary goods are used. Rawls 
wanted to leave this open, for there are so many different possibilities that we 
cannot reasonably expect there to be any convergence. For Rawls, the primary 
goods are merely proxies for the pursuit and subsequent satisfaction of life 
plans (Rawls 1975, 551-4; Rawls 1988, 258). Let us consider the following 
case: 
 
Differing comprehensive doctrines: Two people possess similar 
amounts of primary goods. However, one of them subscribes to a 
comprehensive doctrine involving the renunciation of material 
pleasures, and requires much less of the goods to succeed in her 
pursuit.  
 
The case brings to sharper relief the fact that the list of primary goods is 
intended to be insensitive to the manner that the goods are used in the pursuit 
of ends. Returning to Rawls's response – we see that what he was doing was 
not to avoid Sen’s criticism, but instead to restate the intention to be 
insensitive. It is only in being insensitive to the manners that the goods are 





If we have a sense that this response is nevertheless inadequate, it cannot be 
because we think that insensitivity is itself a problem. Indeed, being 
insensitive to the manner that primary goods are used is only a problem for the 
theory if the theory deems someone to be in a position to pursue their life 
plans when she in fact is not – it excludes certain individuals as members of 
the least-advantaged when in fact they are. Rawls's focus on the least-
advantaged would subsequently mean that these individuals are not catered for 
by the framework. This criticism can be refined, using another case.  
 
Poor pregnant: Two people possess similarly little amounts of primary 
goods, and are close to being members of the worst-off group in 
society. However, one of them is pregnant, and requires more nutrition 
than the other. She has to spend more resources on nutrition than the 
other, and what she is left with is not enough to pursue her life plans.  
 
It is only in a situation like this that the problem of insensitivity poses a 
problem for the theory. But in this case, the problem really is that the poor 
pregnant woman does not have enough to pursue her life plans. We should see 
the problem of insensitivity as being located at this level, pertaining only to 
those who find themselves unable to pursue their ends once the manner in 
which they use their goods is factored in. The problem is sharpened if we 
consider the cases of the disabled, most of whom do not have a choice in their 
disability. Similarly, the problem has to lie at a point where they do not have 
enough to pursue their ends, once they spend resources to overcome their 
disability. At this point, those who are nevertheless able to pursue their ends 
after spending resources to overcome their disability do not yet pose a problem 
for Rawls's theory.  
 
I suggest that Rawls's framework offers a solution for us to resolve this 
problem, once we look to the other part of the second principle – that of 
ensuring that social and economic inequalities are arranged such that they are 
attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of 
opportunity (TJ 302-303/266). This has been referred to as the principle of fair 
70 
 
equality of opportunity (FEO). On Rawls's picture, FEO takes lexical priority 
to the difference principle – and this constitutes the potential basis for a 
resolution to the problem we now face.  
 
In describing the fair equality of opportunity, Rawls contrasted it with what he 
described as merely formal equality of opportunity (TJ 73/63). This is the 
same distinction that was used in the introductory chapter to distinguish 
between different access to the conditions necessary for the pursuit of life 
plans. Let us consider what the implications of this distinction are for the case 
of the poor pregnant. In the case of the poor pregnant, Rawls's analysis would 
be that the pregnant woman does not possess fair equality of opportunity 
compared to someone else who otherwise possesses a similar amount of the 
other primary goods as she does. In this case, the issue is only crudely about 
the differences in individuals' usage of the primary goods, but is more 
accurately described as one of unequal opportunities. On the basis of the 
Rawlsian principles, what needs to be done is to first equalise the 
opportunities that these two individuals have. Only after that will it be a fair 
comparison. The FEO allows us a way out via showing that in the cases we 
have described, the inequality in the extent which individuals are successful in 
pursuing their life plans stems from an inequality in opportunities. The more 
pressing task at hand would be to resolve that inequality. Achieving equality 
in opportunities would also mean that the variances in the ways people make 
use of primary goods is accounted for.  
 
Applying this conclusion to the case of the moderately mentally disabled, we 
see that part of the solution is to ensure that we equalise their opportunities. 
Let us consider this solution as it applies to the cases of Arthur and Jamie. In 
their cases – as is with the non-disabled – the extent to which they can pursue 
their life plans is not only determined by the primary goods they have, but also 
the opportunities they have fair access to. The original criticism that the 
primary goods are irrelevant to them neglects the fact that opportunities will 
have to be equalised for them fairly, in accordance with others who are of 
similar talent and abilities (TJ 73/63). This can be achieved by the basic 
structure via a whole range of strategies, such as educational and medical 
71 
 
subsidies, professional care-givers paid for by the state, state-sponsored 
medical research, and campaigns to educate the public. Taken together, these 
will be able to play a role in equalising the opportunities that the moderately 
mentally disabled have access to. This coheres with Rawls's statement that the 
basic structure has to "[regulate] the overall trends of economic events and 
[preserve] the social conditions necessary for fair equality of opportunity" (TJ 
73/63), such that "those who are at the same level of talent and ability, and 
have the same willingness to use them, should have the same prospects of 
success [in pursuing their life plans] regardless of their initial place in the 
social system" (TJ 73/63). 
 
This move also allows us to resolve an earlier worry about over-
demandingness. In only requiring that opportunities be fairly equalised for 
those who are at the same level of talent and ability, the theory leaves open 
any possible strategies that go beyond that. What this means is that once the 
opportunities are made fairly equal, in accordance to talent and abilities, the 
basic structure has no further obligation to improve the talents and abilities of 
its citizens. In thinking this way, we have a ready answer to those disabled 
citizens whose talents and abilities are extremely diminished, or even absent. 
For them, all that the FEO grants is that they not be put in positions which are 
unfairly worse off compared to others similarly disabled – without demanding 
that the basic structure has obligations of justice to maximise their talents or 
abilities, or to bring them up to a level at which they can then contribute in the 
same ways as the non-disabled. Any additional obligations that we deem we 
have to bring them up to those levels will lie outside the domain of basic 
political justice.  
 
On closer look, the FEO does a lot more work than critics of Rawls seem to 
think his theory is able to offer. In particular, one of the most outstanding 
implications of the FEO is that it seeks to fairly equalise the opportunities of 
the mentally disabled. This is indeed a rather lofty aim, especially given how 
even till this day we cannot say that all our mentally disabled citizens possess 
equal opportunities as those whose talents and abilities they approximate. The 
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FEO obliges us to do more than we currently do, and may in fact be exactly 
what the critics are looking for anyway.  
 
We started with a worry about distribution to the mentally disabled, which had 
two parts. We resolved the first – about the contribution of the disabled – by 
elaborating on the concept of contribution, in accordance with the motivations 
of the parties in the legislative stage. We responded to the second – about the 
adequacy of the goods in addressing the claims of the disabled – by pointing 
out that it is possible for the primary goods to deal with their claims, as well as 
that the principle of fair equality of opportunity would be able to do some 
work in meeting the claims of the disabled. 32  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 Does this simply take on the work that the capabilities approach purports to do? Insofar as 
we know that the capabilities approach tackles the issue of disadvantage in the space of 
opportunities, this solution bears striking resemblance to it. However, it is beyond the scope of 





I began with two distinct worries about the motivations and consequences of 
Rawls's postponement of the issue of disability to a later stage of his theory. I 
responded to the first, by pointing out that the postponement does not suggest 
that our obligations to the mentally disabled are less important. Instead, it 
serves to ensure that issues pertaining to disability will be most appropriately 
considered in light of the relevant information, available only in the later 
stages of the theory. The second worry was that starting from non-disabled 
citizens, the theory is unable to deal with the claims of the disabled 
adequately.  
 
In attempting to specify what exactly is meant by ‘starting from non-disabled 
citizens’, I considered Nussbaum’s criticisms that there are other elements in 
Rawls's theory that exclude the claims of the mentally disabled, from the start. 
While Nussbaum misunderstands how Rawls employs the concepts of the 
circumstances of justice and mutual advantage, she is nevertheless on to 
something in pointing out that Rawls's Kantian commitments may run him 
into some problems. The immediate problem is that because the mentally 
disabled do not meet Rawls's description of citizens, they therefore do not fall 
under the scope of justice. I argued that we need not take such a simplistic 
view of the situation – for once we introduce the prudence of the parties into 
the picture, we see that individuals can be the subjects of justice even if they 
are not considered citizens.  
 
The next step was to examine whether or not the distribution of the primary 
goods will constitute an adequate response to the claims of the mentally 
disabled. Looking to Rawls's two principles of justice, which are responsible 
for the distribution of the primary goods, I addressed a preliminary worry 
about the apparent goal-orientation of the distribution – arguing that the 
severely mentally disabled can be subjects of distribution, albeit indirectly. 
 
In assessing the principles for what they say about the distribution of primary 
goods to the disabled, I argued that while the basic rights and liberties 
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(distributed by the first principle) are not relevant to them, it does not mean 
that they are left to die from neglect. Rawls's statement that there should be a 
lexically prior principle guaranteeing the basic needs of citizens, taken 
together with an appeal to the substantive contents of the moral beliefs of 
citizens in a well-ordered society, can fill the role. The basic needs of the 
severely mentally disabled will indeed be met. 
 
The subsequent worry lay in whether these basic needs can be adequately 
specified in terms of the rest of the primary goods. This problem does not arise 
for the most severely mentally disabled citizens – given that distribution to 
them is indirect, it need concern only their guardians. And it is via this indirect 
route that their basic needs can be taken care of within the Rawlsian 
framework. A complication arises, however, in the case of the moderately 
mentally disabled – individuals who posses the two moral powers to a 
diminished extent and are capable of formulating life plans – for whom these 
other primary goods are relevant. The indirect solution is found to be 
inadequate. We do not just want to address only the basic needs of the 
moderately mentally disabled, but also ensure that they, like other individuals, 
have access to the conditions for the pursuit of their life plans. 
 
Two challenges arose at this point. The first was to give an account of the 
grounds for the direct distribution of primary goods to these individuals, 
instead of opting for the indirect route. The second was to ensure that the 
primary goods are adequate in responding to the claims of the moderately 
mentally disabled, to the conditions for the pursuit of their life plans.  
 
The first problem was complicated by Rawls's statement that social 
cooperation is relevant for distribution. The mere fact that the primary goods 
are relevant to the moderately mentally disabled appeared to be an insufficient 
basis for distribution. In responding to this, I drew ideas from Christie 
Hartley’s work establishing that mentally disabled individuals are able to 
engage in cooperative social endeavours, albeit of a different nature. In 
looking more closely at the deliberations of the parties in the legislative stage, 
and by employing some distinctions made by Lawrence Becker, I argued that 
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the parties would be motivated to ensure that a very broad range of activities 
can be considered as social cooperation. This offered us a way of 
understanding how we can include the moderately mentally disabled as 
subjects of direct distribution of resources.  
 
Given that there are bases to distribute resources to the moderately mentally 
disabled, I moved to assess the second issue of whether the primary goods are 
adequate. In doing so, I addressed two criticisms. The first is by Nussbaum, 
who claims that the list omits certain crucial goods – especially that of care. I 
responded by pointing out that given the peculiar demand of needing to be 
neutral across different comprehensive doctrines, the notion of care that 
Nussbaum ends up with does not look too different from what Rawls can offer 
us. The second criticism is by Sen, who argues that the list of primary goods is 
insensitive to variances in how they are used – and therefore inadequate in 
responding to the claims of the disabled. To that, I pointed out that Rawls 
deliberately leaves it an open question as to how the primary goods are used. 
But via the principle of fair equality of opportunities, Rawls is able to iron out 
the problems that Sen is concerned about. Introducing this principle also 
allowed us to finally respond to the second worry: the primary goods are in 
fact adequate in dealing with the mentally disabled, if we situate them within 
all of Rawls's principles governing their distribution.  
 
While there were several points where Rawls's theory was silent on the 
problem, and therefore betrayed a certain inadequacy, we saw that the 
inadequacy was not lethal. In particular, those are simply gaps that Rawls did 
not fill in – and which can be filled in without needing much alteration (if at 
all) to his theory. Finally, we saw that situating the principle of fair equality of 
opportunity in the context of responding to the claims of the mentally 
disabled, gave us more than what critics often seem to think Rawls's theory 
can offer. 
 
I believe this is a suitable point to conclude that Rawls's framework does 
contain resources to adequately address the claims of the mentally disabled. 
While much more can indeed be done, we should be clear that Rawls's 
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framework does not hinder us from doing so. Instead of rejecting the theory 
wholesale, as some have done, we should instead look to seeing how we can 
elaborate on the under-specified elements, and fill in the various gaps, in 
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